CSR as Contractarian Model of Multi-Stakeholder Corporate Governance and the Game-Theory of its Implementation by L. Sacconi
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1163704
 
CSR AS CONTRACTARIAN MODEL OF MULTI-STAKEHOLDER 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE GAME-THEORY OF ITS 
IMPLEMENTATION 

 
by 
Lorenzo Sacconi 
Department of Economics, University of Trento  and 
EconomEtica, Interuniversity centre of research at University Milano-Bicocca 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is here defined as a multi-stakeholder model of corporate 
governance and fiduciary duties naturally emerging from a critical assessment of the incomplete contracts 
view of the firm based on concepts like as authority and residual rights of control. As far as the normative 
point of view is concerned, multi-stakeholder fiduciary duties are deduced from a theory of the firm‘s 
stakeholders Social Contract. This provide for a clear cut and calculable objective function, a criterion for 
governance and strategic management no less able to set a bottom-line to the firm management than the 
profit maximization principle. The theory of co-operative bargaining games, and the Nash bargaining 
solution in particular, provides the key concepts. By the way this also answers some criticisms raised by 
Michael Jensen (2001) against the notion of stakeholders value.   
As far as implementation of the normative model is concerned, four roles of voluntary but explicit  CSR 
norms or social standard are presented in terms of a non-cooperative game theory of implementation. It is 
shown that they allow the description of strategies and equilibria, even if multiple, in a game played under 
unforeseen contingencies. Secondly, a CSR norm permits the ex ante selection of the equilibrium point 
that meets the requirements of an impartial choice. An explicit agreement on a contractarian norm is 
moreover a way to introduce psychological conformist equilibria, and quite surprisingly to derive the 
significant result that mixed strategy equilibria are absent in a psychological repeated Trust Game. Lastly, a 
cognitive and predictive role is played by an agreed CSR norm as the appropriate starting point for an 
equilibrium selection mechanism that, from a state of predictive uncertainty about possible equilibria, 
generates a state of mutually consistent expectations consistent with the prediction that all players will 
converge on the psychological equilibrium fully conforming with the norm as the effective solution of the 
game. 
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1.   Introduction  
Aim of this essay is pointing out a full fledged theory of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
seen as both normatively convincing and implementable model of multi-stakeholder corporate 
governance. My use of ‗normative‘ is here in the same vein of welfare economics and economic 
ethics -as it is concerned with proposals of desirable reforms of economic institutions that 
improve social wellbeing and consistency with social justice and fairness according to an ethical 
assessment based on the idea of impartial ex ante unanimous agreement (i.e. the social contract)1. 
Questions about implementation of a given normative model, like as what kind of rules should 
provide for it, what incentives and individual motivations support it, whether a legal enforcement 
is required or not, and whether it may rest on self-enforceability - are important as well. I will 
come to a theory of implementation in the second part of this essay, where I develop a multiple 
attack to the problem of endogenity and self-sustainably of a CSR norm or social standard 
understood according to the normative model. But, of course,  the definition of the normative 
model must come first. 
In this perspective the main questions that a CSR theory is to answer are whether the proposed 
normative model is uniquely defined and sets out a clear-cut normative meaning,  how can it 
solve possible clashes amongst legitimate claims and interests that risk to make its implications 
ambiguous,  whether it is  impartially justified and has the capability to induce efficient level of 
economic investments, what its impacts might be on values like as economic welfare, distributive 
justice and social stability.    
As long as this essay argues in favor of  CSR as a normative model of corporate governance in 
the multi-stakeholder and multi-fiduciary perspective, there are however also some specific and 
well know challenges that must be squarely faced – which as a whole I refer to as Jensen‘s 
challenges to the stakeholder model (see Jensen 2001). First of all, it is a commonly accepted 
prejudice to say that, due to multidimensionality  in  the objectives pursued by a company 
adhering to the stakeholder approach, its objective-function must be necessarily ill defined and 
incapable to endow managers and directors with a clear normative goal able of directing their 
conduct or providing for a definite bottom line whereby their performance becomes assessable. 
Moreover, the lack of a unique goal would also improperly enlarge managerial discretion and 
make the board‘s fiduciary duties and accountability owed to shareholders devoid of any precise 
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content, whereby it may be concluded that the indefiniteness of a multiple objective-function 
opens the route to managerial opportunistic manipulation and self-dealing.   
On the contrary, I will show  that the CSR model of corporate governance rests on a well defined 
company objective-function, at least as well precise as the ‗profit maximisation‘ goal  that 
microeconomic theory traditionally attributes to the firm. It is worthwhile noting that such a 
statement  is made without giving up the methodological individualist tenet typical of economic 
theory that the corporate goal must not be defined as an attribute of the corporation seen as a 
holistic and collectivist entity on its own,  but should be reduced  to goals and interests of its 
constituencies -that is in my view the corporate stakeholders.  Moreover, in so far as the CSR 
model derives the corporate objective-function from a social contract theory of the firm, 
managers and directors cannot behave with arbitrary discretion. On the contrary  they result 
constrained by the principles of contractarian  ethics, which allows deriving fiduciary duties owed 
to each company stakeholders. The social contract model hence helps curbing both managerial 
slacks and abuse of authority that those who are in position to run the firm may carry out against 
the legitimate interests of all the non-controlling corporate stakeholders who are also under many 
respects under-protected by normally incomplete contracts.  
What is most important, however, is that the social contract model counteracts the presumption 
that CSR, while expressing laudable concerns for social issues, would be  unable to account for 
the proper nature of the firm as an economic institution. As it will be shown, the CSR model 
answer questions concerning the very nature of the firm and provide for both explanation and 
justification of how the corporation might emerge as an economic institution run to the mutual 
advantage of its stakeholders. 
Once the normative model will have been developed, however, any economic-minded reader will 
wonder whether it is not just wishful thinking, i.e. whether the model may accords with real 
world incentives and interests that drive economic interaction amongst real life economics agents. 
This amounts to require a basic change in the perspective of argumentation, from  the normative 
- where impartial and  universalizable reasons to act must take the precedence - to the 
implementation one, a step that I will undertake  in the second part. 2 
Implementation is a domain wherein we have to look for mechanisms of endogenous  
motivation, based on a realistic account of preference and beliefs of economic agents as they are,  
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 I have presented the ideas of  a normative model of CSR also in some previous works  (see Sacconi 2004, 2006). Its 
implementation theory here exposed on the contrary is novel except for the treatment of unforeseen contingencies 
already given in (Sacconi 2000 and 2007).   
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that would make the model implementation self-sustainable. First of all it requires verifying 
whether the model could stand up by itself without a strong  imposition of sanctions and 
inducement from the outside its own basic system of interaction (the corporate realm of the 
interaction amongst firms and their stakeholders). No doubts, this does not exclude supports that 
could be given by a proper regulation or  - as long as some legal frameworks have been 
developed to support a different normative model of the corporation - by a change in regulation,  
or  in general supports that may come from social and legal institutions based in different social 
subsystems (i.e. the legal system, or the civil society)3. But to start an implementation theory it  is 
needed first of all  to see whether the model can be sustained through the (equilibrium) rational 
choices carried out by the agents participating within the social interaction context basically 
relevant to the model (i.e. that involving interactions amongst companies and stakeholders - 
which is a domain wide enough to allow for a large array of situations) and the social norm and 
institutions they are able to develop within this context by themselves.  
The idea of self-sustainability immediately leads to think that the implementation of the CSR 
normative model should  be a matter of self-regulation and voluntariness. This is also a basic  
tenet of the second part of this essays. But it should  be clear that there is a large gulf between 
two ways in which voluntariness and self-regulation may be understood, and they must not be  
confused. On the one hand a view again masterly represented by professor Jensen (Jensen 2001) 
thinks that it coincides with shareholder value maximization in the long run, a sort of re-
elaboration of the standard selfish view of the proprietary‘s goal (even if sometime ownership is 
well diffused throughout the stock market)  whereby the firm should be run. According to this 
view CSR is only a matter of wise  strategic management that endeavors to long term shareholder 
value maximization with the appropriate means (including stakeholders claims satisfaction).  On  
the other hand there is an idea, that I actively purport,  that voluntariness must coincide with the 
development and voluntary adhesion to social norms and social standards explicitly formulated 
through a process of social dialog amongst companies and their stakeholders, which simulates the 
social contract model, such that these explicit norms are able to generate by them-selves the 
incentives and motivations that permits them to be largely endogenously self-enforced.  
I therefore will give an articulate game-theoretic account of how an agreed CSR social norm or 
standard helps solving many problems in the realm of implementation understood as a non-
cooperative game wherein the firm is a player endowed with his own preferences and interests 
strategically interacting with its stakeholders. The game of reference is the Trust Game, a game 
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 For the idea of institutional complementarities that may be used here see  Aoki (2001) 
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where the possibility that a firm abuses its stakeholders‘ trust - i.e. it doesn‘t comply with a model 
of fair cooperation with them - is consubstantial. In this context an explicit CSR norm or social 
standard, incorporating the idea of multi-stakeholder governance, is shown to be helpful under 
many respects. It makes possible describing the game so that several types of reputations based 
on the respect of the CSR model itself may be developed even if unforeseen contingencies are 
involved (se also Sacconi 2000, 2007). It allows impartially selecting just one fair reputation 
equilibrium amongst the many possible. Elaborating on Binmore‘s Natural justice (2005) this task 
is accomplished again from the ex ante (under the ‗veil of ignorance‘) point of view,  but in a way 
that allows to find out a unique course of action that satisfies the requirement of incentive 
compatibility (i.e. a Nash equilibrium). Further,  an agreed CSR social norm aids reducing to just 
two the candidate reputation equilibria that ex post, in the real world interaction taking place 
beyond  the ―veil of ignorance‖, may be played after an agreement (maybe seen as cheap-talk and 
not-binding) over a general principle of fairness has been reached by the firm and its 
stakeholders. These equilibria are defined not as traditional Nash equilibria, but as psychological 
equilibria according to the theory of conformist preferences (Grimalda  and  Sacconi 2005) 
developed along the lines of other behavioral game models (Genakoplos et al. 1986,  Rabin 
1993). Last, given the psychological equilibria that remain candidate  as possible results of the 
game, it admits to identify and to make credible the initial players‘ beliefs over the possible game 
solutions wherefrom an equilibrium selection dynamic (representing the revision process of 
mutual expectation) singles out the game solution effectively carried out (my favorite equilibrium 
selection dynamics is the Harsanyi‘s tracing procedure – see Harsanyi and Selten 1988). For a large 
array of situations, that are cognitively the most reliable in case the players have ex ante agreed on 
a social norm or standard (even if the agreement is not binding), the process selects an 
equilibrium corresponding to the normative model of multi-stakeholder fiduciary duties. 
 
PART I 
 
2.  A definition of CSR 
According to many views, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR thereafter) is a form of corporate 
strategic management that sets corporate standards of conduct at a level higher than mandatory 
legal constraints, and envisages itself as a system for the governance of transactions between a firm 
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and its stakeholders.4 It is clear that here ‗governance‘ is no longer the set of rules simply 
allocating property rights and defining the owners‘ control over the company‘s management. 
Instead it resembles the neo-institutional view whereby the firm, like the contract and other 
institutional forms, is a ‗governance system‘ which establishes diverse rights and obligations in 
order to reduce ‗transaction costs‘ and the negative externalities due to economic transactions.     
I therefore propose the following definition of CSR: a model of extended corporate governance whereby 
who runs a firm (entrepreneurs, directors, managers) have responsibilities that range from fulfilment of their 
fiduciary duties towards the owners to fulfilment of analogous fiduciary duties towards all the firm’s stakeholders. 
   Two terms must be  defined for the foregoing proposition may be clearly understood:  
a) Fiduciary duties. It is assumed that a subject has a legitimate interest but is unable to make the 
relevant decisions, in the sense that s/he does not know what goals to pursue, what alternative to 
choose, or how to deploy his/her resources in order to satisfy his/her interest. S/he, the trustor, 
therefore delegates decisions to a trustee empowered to choose actions and goals. The trustee may 
thus use the trustor‘s resources and select the appropriate course of action. For a fiduciary 
relationship – this being the basis of the trustee‘s authority vis-à-vis the trustor – to arise, the latter 
must possess a claim (right) towards the former. In other words, the trustee directs actions and 
uses the resources made over to him/her so that results are obtained which satisfy (to the best 
extent possible) the trustor‘s interests. These claims (i.e. the trustor‘s rights) impose fiduciary 
duties on the agent who is entitled with authority (the trustee), which s/he is obliged to fulfil. The 
fiduciary relation applies in a wide variety of instances: tutor/minor and teacher/pupil 
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 This view is consistent with  the UE Commission initial definition of CSR ―By stating their social responsibility and 
voluntarily taking on commitments which go beyond common regulatory and conventional requirements, which they 
would have to respect in any case, companies endeavor to raise the standards of social development, environmental 
protection and respect of fundamental rights and embrace an open governance, reconciling interests of various stakeholders in 
an overall approach of quality and sustainability‖ (Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility,  Green 
Paper, p.4, Brussels, 18.7.2001, emphasis added). Moreover it is consistent  with the way CSR is understood in many 
European multistakeholder project of CSR management systems like as in the UK the Accountability 1000 standard 
for ethical and social audit and reporting has been developed, followed by the Sigma Project supported  by  the Blair 
government. A Values Management System has been developed in Germany at the University of Konstanz (Wieland 
2003), while CSR standards modeled on the example of quality management systems have been proposed by 
independent bodies of standardization in Spain (Aenor) and France (Afnor). As far Italy is concerned, may  be quoted 
the GBS standard for social reporting issued in the spring of 2001, and the Q-RES Project aiming to define a quality 
standard of management systems for ethical and social responsibility of firms. The latter  initiative led in October 
2001 to issuing the  Q-RES Management Guidelines, see (Sacconi et al. 2003), and more recently to the setting of the Q-
RES Norm for the Improvement of Corporate Ethical-Social Performances of Organisations (March 2003) see (Sacconi, deColle, 
Baldin, Oakley, Wieland and Zadek 2003) 
More in general, even if some authors would not subscribe to CSR as the proper nickname, this view is consistent 
with how corporate responsibilities and accountability are seen in the stakeholder approach  (Freeman 1984, 
Freeman and Evans 1989, Donaldson and Preston 1995, Clarkson 1999, Freeman, McVea 2004, Freeman, Velamury, 
2006). 
 
7 
 
relationships, and (in the corporate domain) the relation between the board of a trust and its 
beneficiaries, or according to the predominant opinion, between the board of directors of a joint-
stock company and its shareholders and then more generally between management and owners 
(if the latter do not run the enterprise themselves). By the term ‗fiduciary duty‘, therefore, is 
meant the duty (or responsibility) to exercise authority for the good of those who have granted 
that authority and are therefore subject to it.5  
b) Stakeholders. This term denotes individuals or groups with a major stake in the running of the 
firm and who are able to influence it significantly (Freeman and McVea 2002). However, a 
distinction should be drawn between the following two categories: 
(i) Stakeholders in the strict sense: those who have an interest at stake because they have made 
specific investments in the firm (in the form of human capital, financial capital, social capital or 
trust, physical or environmental capital, or for the development of dedicated technologies, etc.) – 
that is, investments which may significantly increase the total value generated by the firm (net of 
the costs sustained for that purpose) and which are made specifically in relation to that firm (and 
not in any other) so that their value is idiosyncratically related to the completion of the 
transactions carried out by or in relation to that firm. These stakeholders are reciprocally 
dependent on the firm because they influence its value but at the same time – given the 
specificity of their investment – depend largely upon it for satisfaction of their well-being 
prospects (lock-in effect). 
(ii) Stakeholders in the broad sense: those individuals or groups whose interest is involved because 
they undergo the ‗external effects‘, positive or negative, of the transactions performed by the firm, 
even if they do not directly participate in the transaction, so that they do not contribute to, nor 
directly receive value from the firm. 
       It is evident that these two categories cannot be sharply separated. For example, a 
manufacturer in a developing country who supplies a component for an industrial good 
assembled in a Western European country is essentially dependent on his contract; and with his 
low labour costs (due to the customer‘s market power) he makes a crucial contribution to the 
European firm‘s profits. At the same time, however, if a mature technology is used, he is easily 
replaceable by the European firm, whose dependence on the supplier is therefore limited (in 
short, the reciprocal dependence relation is not symmetric). Likewise, a local community may not 
be party to the transactions performed by a company with a plant on its territory, but it is 
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nevertheless subject to that plant‘s environmental and social externalities. However, if the 
community has representative institutions with the power to grant or withhold a ‗licence to 
operate‘, it is able to influence the company‘s creation of value and negotiate a reduction in the 
negative externalities. These decisions – connected as they are with the furnishing of 
infrastructures – may be viewed as investments intended to select and attract production activities 
whose positive externalities outweigh their negative ones. 
   We are now able to appreciate the scope of CSR defined as an extended form of governance: it 
extends the concept of fiduciary duty from a mono-stakeholder setting (where the sole 
stakeholder relevant to identification of fiduciary duties is the owner of the firm) to a multi-
stakeholder one in which the firm owes fiduciary duties to all its stakeholders (the owners 
included). It is obvious that classification of stakeholders on the basis of the nature of their 
relationship with the firm must be regarded as important in gauging these further fiduciary 
duties.6 
 
3. „Abuse of authority‟: the economic basis of extended fiduciary duties owed to 
corporate stakeholders 
 
Let us now inquire whether economic theory provides support for the thesis that the firm has 
‗further‘ responsibilities towards its stakeholders. According to neo-institutional theory 
(Williamson 1975, 1986; Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990; Hart 1995; Hansmann 
1996), the firm emerges as an institutional  form of ‗unified transactions governance‘ intended to 
remedy imperfections in the contracts that regulate exchange relations among subjects endowed 
with diverse assets (capital, labour, instrumental goods, consumption decisions, and so on). These 
assets, if used jointly, are able to generate a surplus over the cost of their use that is higher than in 
the case of their separate use by each asset-holder. However, contracts by which these asset-
holders regulate their exchanges are incomplete: they do not include provisos covering 
unforeseen events, owing to the costs of drafting them, or because the cognitive limits of the 
human mind make it impossible to predict all possible states of the world. Yet for these assets to 
                                                          
6 At first sight, it might be objected that many stakeholders, in both the ‗strict‘ and ‗broad‘ senses, do not have 
relations with a firm such that they formally delegate authority to those who run it (for example, they do not vote), 
with the consequence that the fiduciary duties as defined earlier do not apply to them. However, in the model of the 
social contract as a hypothetical explanation of the origin of the firm – see section 5.2 – all the stakeholders 
participate in the ―firm‘s second social contract‖, with the consequence that their trust constitutes the authority of 
the firm‘s owner and manager. This also explains how the authority of the latter may be accepted by these subjects. 
Moreover, the hypothetical social contract is typically used to explain how authority – that is, legitimate power – may 
come about at both the political and organizational levels: cf. Green (1990), Raz (1985), Watt (1982). For a 
discussion of managerial authority see MacMahon (1989) and Sacconi (1991).     
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be used in the best manner possible, specific investments must be made: investments undertaken 
with a view to the value that they may produce within a idiosyncratic contractual relation. This 
entails that the surplus generated with respect to the costs sustained by each party to the 
exchange is determined by the undertaking of specific activities with specific counterparts (suppliers, 
customers, employees, financiers, etc.). Let us assume that parties behave opportunistically (that 
is, they are egoists who act with astuteness). Thus, once the investments have been made, 
contractual incompleteness means that the terms of the contract can be renegotiated, so that the 
party in a stronger ex post position is able to appropriate the entire surplus, thereby expropriating 
the other stakeholders. But if agents expect to be expropriated, they will have no incentive to 
undertake their investments at the optimal level. This expectation of unfair treatment gives rise to 
a loss of efficiency at the social level. 
   The firm responds to this problem by bringing the various transactions under control of a 
hierarchical authority – the authority, that is, of the party which owns the firm and through 
ownership is entitled to make decisions over the contingencies that were not ex ante contractible. 
Unified governance supplements incomplete contracts with authority relations through the 
vertical and horizontal integration of the units that previously made separate contributions. The 
firm is therefore a special contractual form: when contracts lack provisos contingent upon 
unforeseen events, they can be ‗completed‘ with the ‗residual right of control‘ which entitles its 
holder to decide what should be done about decisions not ex ante contractible– that is, decisions 
‗left over‘ from the original contract and that become available only when unforeseen situations 
occur.  
   The residual right of control underpins authority: those parties entitled with residual right of 
control may threaten the other parties to the contract with exclusion from the physical assets of 
the firm, thereby ensuring that ex ante non-contracted decisions are taken ex post to their own 
advantage. They are thus safeguarded against opportunism by the other stakeholders, and they 
are able to protect the expected value of their investments in situations where contract 
incompleteness provides margins of discretion when residual decisions have to be taken. There is 
therefore an efficiency rationale for the idea of the firm as ‗unified governance‘ of transactions: if 
one party (a class of stakeholders) has made a specific investment of greater importance than 
those made by the others at risk, or if its exercise of ‗unified governance‘ discourages 
opportunism by the others to appropriate the surplus, then that party should be granted the 
property right and with it the right to take ‗residual‘ decisions. This is also the basis for regulation 
of authority delegation from the owners to directors or managers by corporate governance rules, 
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when the owners themselves are not able of directly exercising the entire residual right of control.  
Fiduciary duties owed to the owners must guarantee that delegated exercise of residual rights of  
control by the board of directors or managers will maintain or improve the efficiency of their 
original allocation to the selected class of stakeholders. 
However, one should not underestimate the risks of the firm qua unified governance. There is 
not just one single stakeholder at risk because of contract incompleteness; it is usually the case 
that multiple stakeholders undertake specific investments (investments in human capital, 
investments of trust by consumers, investments of financial capital, investments by suppliers in 
raw materials, technologies and instrumental goods). Contracts with these stakeholders are also 
incomplete.  
   Yet if a firm brings its contracts with certain stakeholders (labour contracts, obligations towards 
and relations with minority shareholders) under the authority of a party to whom is allocated 
control over residual decisions (for example, the controlling shareholder group) – and more 
generally if a party is enabled by its de facto power to exercise discretion over ex ante non-
contractible decisions concerning implicit or explicit contractual relations with the other 
stakeholders (consumers, customers, suppliers, creditors, etc.) – what, one may ask, is there to 
ensure protection of investments and interests other than those of the controlling stakeholder? It 
is evident that if fiduciary duties attach only to ownership, those stakeholders without residual right 
of control will not be protected by the fiduciary duties of those who run the firm. 
   The inherent risk, therefore, is an abuse of authority (Sacconi 2000). Those wielding authority 
may use it to expropriate the specific investments of others by exploiting ‗gaps‘ in contracts – 
which persist even under unified governance (in fact it simply allocates to only one stakeholder 
the right to ‗fill‘ those gaps with its discretionary decisions). Those in a position of authority, in 
fact, are able to threaten the other stakeholders with exclusion from access to physical assets of 
the firm, or from the benefits of the contract, to the point that those other stakeholders become 
indifferent between accepting the expropriation and forgoing the value of their investments by 
withdrawing from the relation. Thus the entire surplus, included that part of it imputable to 
efforts and investments made by the non controlling stakeholders, will be appropriated by the 
controlling party. Again forward-looking stakeholders will be deterred form entering the 
hierarchical transaction with the controlling party. In general, this will produce a internal crisis of 
legitimacy between firm and stakeholders (a crisis in the relationships between the organizational 
authorities and participants in the organization) and an external crisis of trust (in relationships with 
stakeholders that have entered into contractual or external relations with the organization). 
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Various stakeholders will ex ante have a reduced incentive to invest (if they foresee the risk of 
abuse), while ex post they will resort to conflicting or disloyal behavior (typically possible when 
asymmetry of information is inherent in the execution of some subordinate activity) in the belief 
that they are being subjected to abuse of authority. In the economist‘s jargon, this is a ‗second 
best‘ state of affairs (less than optimum): all governance solutions based on the allocation of 
property rights to a single party may approximate social efficiency, but they can never fully achieve 
it. This much is acknowledged by the theoreticians of contractual incompleteness when they 
point out that the allocation of the residual right of control induces the party protected by that 
right to over-invest, while those not so protected are induced to under-invest, with a consequent 
shortfall with regard to the social optimum (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart 1995).  
   On the other hand, if the stakeholder category entitled to exercise ownership (the double right 
of controlling residual decisions and claiming residual revenue; cf. Hansmann 1987, 1996) is 
selected on the basis of its ability to minimize total costs deriving form the summation of 
contractual costs borne by of various stakeholders and costs of exercising authority, it is by no 
means certain that a solution will be found which reduces each of those costs to the minimum 
(that is, reduces opportunism suffered by each stakeholder to the minimum). Sufficient for this 
solution to emerge is, for example, that the governance costs of one class (the capital-holders, for 
example) are low enough to counterbalance a relative increase in the contractual  costs borne by 
another class (the workers, for example) compared to alternative cases (for instance the case in 
which there is no centralized governance, or the one in which it is a sub-set of workers that 
governs, or the consumers). In this case, too, some incentives are nullified, which distances the 
real-world solution from complete (Paretian) social efficiency. The fact is that the relative 
(in)efficiency depends on manifest or simply expected unfairness: separation between efficiency 
and fairness (a myth of neoclassical economics) is no longer feasible when we face the real-life 
problem of working out acceptable solution for the governance of transactions.  
   My suggestion is therefore that when CSR is viewed as ‗extended governance‘, it completes the 
firm as an institution of transactions governance (cf. Sacconi 2000). The firm‘s legitimacy deficit 
(whatever category of stakeholders is placed in control of it) is remedied if the residual control 
right is accompanied by further fiduciary duties towards the subjects at risk of abuse of authority 
and deprived of the residual control right. At the same time, this is a move towards greater social 
efficiency because it reduces the disincentives and social costs generated by the abuse of 
authority. From this perspective, ‗extended governance‘ should comprise: 
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 the residual control right (ownership) allocated to the stakeholder with the largest investments at 
risk and with relatively low governance costs, as well as the right to delegate authority to 
professional directors and management; 
 the fiduciary duties of those who effectively run the firm (administrators and managers) towards 
the owners, given that these have delegated control to them; 
 the fiduciary duties of those in a position of authority in the  firm (the owner or the managers) towards the non-
controlling stakeholders: the obligation, that is, to run the firm in a manner such that these 
stakeholders are not deprived of their fair shares of the surplus produced from their specific 
investments, and that they are not subject to negative externalities. 7 
     A number of recent economic and legal models of governance support this view of CSR. For 
example, the firm can be seen as a ‗nexus‘ of specific investments regulated by incomplete 
contracts, rather than as a nexus of simple contracts, and therefore as a team of actors 
cooperating to produce a surplus from those specific investments (Rajan and Zingales 2000). 
Based on a similar view which combines different theories of the firm – the theory of incomplete 
contracts with that of team production – is the model of multi-stakeholder governance developed 
by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, and which sees the purpose of corporate governance 
structures as being prevention of opportunistic behavior among the N members of the team that 
make specific investments. When applied to a public company, this model translates into a board 
of directors acting as a mediating hierarchy: an authority system charged with the task of finding 
the appropriate balance in the protection of diverse interests (cf. Blair, Stout 1999, 2006). The 
(controversial) legal basis for this form of  ―impartial governance‖ exercised by the board of 
directors and by management in the US joint-stock company is the ‗business judgment doctrine‘: 
the manager‘s use of a standard of professional conduct which insulates his/her choices against 
claims by shareholders (cf. Blair, Stout 1999, but also see Meese 2002). 
   However, a number of unanswered questions remain which the proponent of CSR as ‗extended 
governance‘ must necessarily address. Does there exist a criterion with which to give more 
precise specification to these extended duties, and from which it is possible to derive a strategic 
management standard of sufficient clarity such that the ‗extended governance‘ model cannot be 
accused to entail higher governance costs than the traditional ‗narrow‘ corporate governance 
view? What norms are effective for the implementation  of CSR? What is the role of company 
                                                          
7 I have proposed in a previous work (cf. Sacconi 1991) a view of managerial ethics based on a similar  analysis of the 
theory of firm, as well as on the cooperative game theory of the firm put forward by Mashairo Aoki (Aoki 1984) and 
the notion of extended fiduciary duties (cf. Sacconi 2000).   
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law with respect to other parts of the law that impose constraints on corporate behaviour? And 
what role can be played by  self-regulation? 
 
4.   The Social Contract as a governance criterion for the fair balance of stakeholders‟ 
interests  
 
If a firm is a team of participants with specific investments, then the metaphor of a ‗bargaining 
cooperative game‘ among multiple stakeholders can be applied. These stakeholders must agree on 
a shared action plan (a joint strategy) which allocates tasks among the members of the team so 
that the contribution of each of them is efficient (because it produces the maximum surplus net 
of each stakeholder‘s costs). The ‗bargaining cooperative game‘ played by the stakeholders is 
typically one of mixed interests. Although it is in their common interest to cooperate, because 
this enables them to produce a surplus that would otherwise be impossible, conflict nevertheless 
persists among the stakeholders over the distribution of the value created. ‗Governance‘ and 
strategic management consequently consist in the solution of two problems: 
a. Identifying the joint strategy that the stakeholders (as the players in the cooperative game) 
may utilize to coordinate themselves, in that they accept it ex ante as a voluntary agreement to 
cooperate – so that strategic management can reduce bargaining costs (time, conflict, etc.) and 
the costs of gathering information on the alternatives available and on the intentions of each 
players about cooperation. 
b. Ensuring ex post that each member of the team complies with the agreement on the joint 
strategy selected and does not act as a free rider with regard to the others.  
   Choosing the joint strategy (point a) is equivalent to select a bargaining equilibrium. It must 
therefore answer the question of what is due to each stakeholder and what each of them can 
expect from the firm in exchange for its contribution, so that each stakeholder may agree on that 
joint strategy. The question thus arises as to how the stakeholders‘ interests can be balanced 
against each other, and what claims on the firm should be considered the appropriate basis for 
the management‘s fiduciary duties. ‗Stakeholder‘, in fact, is a descriptive term. It reminds us that a 
variety of classes of individuals have interests at stake in the running of the firm, and that they 
may sometimes advance conflicting claims. The use of the term ‗stakeholder‘, however, does not 
provide a criterion with which to balance claims when they are mutually conflicting. 
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   To answer the question we consequently need a criterion able to identify the balance that any 
whatever stakeholder would accept as the basis for its voluntary cooperation with the firm: that is, an 
impartial criterion. It is here that ethics – understood as a set of impartial criteria for collective 
choice-making – come into play as part of the firm‘s governance and strategic management. 
   As an ethical criterion, therefore, I suggest the ‗social contract‘ among the stakeholders of the 
firm (Sacconi 1991, 2000). By ‗social contract‘ I mean not any whatever real-life bargain but a 
‗touchstone‘ from which point of view to assess the diverse outcomes of day by day practical 
running of the firm. In other words, the social contract is the agreement that would be reached 
by the representatives of all the firm‘s stakeholders in a hypothetical situation of impartial 
choice.8 Corresponding to the notion of ‗social contract‘ is the following multi-stage deliberative 
procedure which generates impartially acceptable agreements. 
(i) Force, fraud and manipulation must be set aside. 
(ii) Each party comes to the bargaining table with only its capacity to contribute and its 
assessment of the utility of each agreement or non-agreement proposed (dispensing with any 
form of threat other than its possible refusal to agree). 
(iii) The bargaining status quo must be set at a level such that each stakeholder results immune 
against the cost of its specific investments – that is, each stakeholder must obtain from the social 
contract at least reimbursement of the cost of the specific investment with which it has 
contributed to the surplus (otherwise the bargaining process would permit opportunistic 
exploitation of the counterparty‘s lock-in situation). The distribution of the surplus is regulated 
by the social contract – and by the corresponding deliberative procedure – on the basis of ‗initial 
endowments‘ thus defined. 
(iv) Each party in turn puts itself in the position of all the others, and in the position of each of 
them he can accept or reject the contractual alternatives proposed. 9 
                                                          
8 It is quite evident the debt of this contractarian view on the theory of firm to the works of  both  John Rawls (1971, 
1993) and David Gauthier (1986). For the first formulation of the theory of the corporate social contract, based the 
revision of neo-institutionalist theory of firm and with reference to the problem of the abuse of authority vis-à-vis 
stakeholders, see however Sacconi (1991), and latterly Sacconi (2000). For a formulation external to economic theory 
see Dunfee and Donaldson (1995).  
9
 This step amounts to requiring that the decision maker puts himself under a ‗veil of ignorance‘  concerning his 
identity and hence he takes each individual position in turn in order to discover what he would accept in case he 
were each particular stakeholder who seats at the bargaining table. This veil of ignorance is thinner than  Rawls‘ one, 
for by this permutation of the individuals‘ point of views the decision maker may appreciate each player‘s preference, 
whereas the Rawlsian veil of ignorance makes impossible to learn any individual characteristics that would permit 
reconstructing the individuals‘  life plans, so that all the different players are all perfectly indistinguishable  from the 
point of view of the decision maker under the veil of ignorance (see Rawls 1971).   
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(v) If solutions are found which are acceptable to some stakeholders but not to others, these 
solutions must be discarded and the procedure repeated (which reflects the assumption that 
cooperation by all stakeholders is recognized as necessary). 
(vi) The terms of the agreement reached are therefore those that each stakeholder is willing to 
accept from its particular point of view: that is, the non-empty intersection of the joint 
strategies and relative distributions acceptable to each of them. 
       Note that this intersection is necessarily non-empty, for otherwise the game would not allow a 
cooperative surplus. That is to say, it would not be the case that joint action by the parties may 
produce something more than their separate action and that at least one surplus distribution 
proves to be reciprocally advantageous (if it must be so, then there exists at least one agreement 
acceptable to all). 
 
5.  Social contract and uniquely defined objective-function of the firm 
 
The main objection brought against CSR is that the multi-stakeholder approach to firm‘s 
governance leaves the management without a clearly-stated and uniquely defined ‗bottom line‘, to 
be used as a benchmark against which to evaluate its success or failure (Jensen 2001). The 
consequence, the argument runs, is that the management exploits this situation to pursue its 
personal interests. It comes up with every possible device to conceal its essentially self-dealing 
behaviour behind the interests of some or other stakeholder. Whereas, the critics of CSR 
maintain, it is easy to check  the managerial strategy (among the alternatives available at any 
particular time) against the criterion   of increasing as much as possible the firm‘s profits, and 
with which the management can be straightforwardly made to comply, this is not the case of 
‗stakeholder value‘, since this consists of numerous dimensions to maximize simultaneously (the 
interests of the various stakeholders). Consequently, stakeholder value contains an intrinsic 
contradiction – the pursuit of conflicting, or at any rate divergent, goals at the same time – so 
that the choice of which strategy to adopt is ultimately left to the mere managerial discretion.10  
   It is evident, however, that this objection does not apply to the model of the social contract of 
the firm proposed here – which by no means ignores the existence of a distributive conflict, but 
                                                          
10 This danger is also stressed by Tirole (2001), who however recognizes the relevance of  the stakeholder approach 
to corporate governance. 
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instead resolves it by identifying a bargaining equilibrium that permits mutual cooperation among 
the members of the team. 
   To be precise, I would add that counterpart to the philosophical contractarian  model is a 
mathematical model of bargaining whose solution is as exactly computable as the profit function 
in microeconomic theory. Hence we can simply substitute profit maximization with 
maximization of the function which assigns the solution to the bargaining game and assume this 
as the firm‘s (perfectly computable) objective-function.11 This solution is simultaneously an 
answer to both the problem of cooperation and that of distributive conflict among the 
stakeholders. Moreover (for those able to appreciate the marvels of mathematics), if the 
bargaining set is well defined (and if one accepts the Nash, Harsanyi and Zeuthen postulates of 
bargaining theory), the solution is defined uniquely, so that the set of admissible solutions is 
reduced to one single alternative. Hence the best pursuit of the interest of the stakeholder 
controlling the firm is equivalent to the solution of the bargaining problem among all the 
stakeholders. (In any event, various theories of bargaining yield solutions which quite closely 
resemble each other – cf. Gauthier (1986) and Kalai and Smordinski (1975) as they are slight 
changes of the basic Nash‘s solution; and for the purposes of this study, identifying a set of 
‗close‘ solutions compatible with the idea of rational bargaining seems good enough).   
    What does this solution say? On the assumption that the external effects on third parties 
with no influence on the transactions are minimized by selection of the forms of cooperation 
which damage them least, one may proceed as follows. Net of the initial (pre-bargaining) position 
or status quo, in which coverage of the costs of specific investments by each stakeholder must be 
included, calculation is made of the value for each stakeholder of each cooperative outcome from 
joint action plans. The set of these values (or better, the set of these vectors of values) is the 
outcomes space associating to each joint action plan (joint strategy) an allocation of the 
cooperative surplus (positive or nil) to the players. Rational bargaining takes place within this 
space among players endeavoring to obtain a share as high as possible of the cooperative surplus 
for themselves, to the detriment of the others‘ shares - once it is taken for granted the need for 
reciprocal agreement, for in its absence they would be unable to obtain anything more than the 
initial position (status quo). Calculable within this space is the Nash bargaining function, the 
product of the utilities of the various stakeholders with specific investments,  that is, an 
aggregative function of their utilities. Where the product (the aggregation) is maximum, there is a 
                                                          
11 For the theory of bargaining games see Harsanyi (1977). Mashaiko Aoki uses the Nash bargaining  solution in his 
theory of the firm, which envisages impartial governance by managers (Aoki 1984). 
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bargaining equilibrium (i.e. a rational agreement among the participants in the social contract) 
corresponding to the Nash bargaining solution (Nash 1950; Harsanyi 1977). (see Fig. 1 for an 
example with two players).12    
This equilibrium does not need operational interpersonal comparisons of utility (which 
operationally are very problematic) in order to be calculated (interpersonal comparisons can be 
confined to the interpretive level13). It obeys, in fact, simple axioms of individual rationality in 
bargaining – like the decision to grant a concession according to the expected personal utility 
given the probability that the counterparty will accept or refuse it, or that a player will not make a 
concession that he or she would not expect the counterparty will make in  a similar situation – 
and conditions of mutually expected rationality, like expecting that the willingness of acceptance 
by the counterparty depends on a symmetric probabilistic assessment of the first party behaviour, 
and not to expect the counterparty to accept something that oneself would not accept, and so on 
(cf. Harsanyi 1977)].  
Of course, if these postulates are taken literally, they can be criticised as unrealistic; and it is likely 
that in the real world agents are unable to maximize or to estimate probabilities coherently, or to 
                                                          
12 Specifically, let us consider a case with two players, 1 and 2, and let us assume that the solution is a point in space 
R2 enclosed between the positive Cartesian axes U1 and U2, each of which measures the utility for a player of the 
outcomes of the cooperative game (see Figure 1). The space therefore represents the outcomes subject to  bargaining 
in terms of their value in utility for the players (i.e. their payoffs). The standard analytical assumption is that the 
payoff space is convex and compact. The payoff space P therefore has an efficient frontier (in the upper-right  
positive ortant) which represents the set of outcomes for which the players‘ utilities cannot be increased by an 
alternative agreement without reducing the utility of at least one other player. Below this frontier are agreements with 
respect to which gains are still possible for all; above it are outcomes unfeasible by any agreement or joint plan of 
action. All points in the space represents different possible values of the coalition among the two  players. In fact, 
only when all of them agree on the solution of the game can they leave the status quo d, which is represented by a 
point interior to the space, so that they may benefit form cooperation. The characteristic function of the coalition 
among all the players is therefore super-additive (it is better to agree than not to agree). Obviously, of interest are 
only those agreements for which there is an efficient allocation. But in what point among those on the frontier 
should the agreement fall? The Nash solution states that the players will agree on the joint strategy corresponding to 
the point of the frontier where the following holds: 
 
 Max i (Ui –di)      (i=1,2 denotes the various participants in the bargaining) 
 
where Ui  is the utility of the generic stakeholder i for the cooperative transaction that it undertakes with the firm, 
and di is the cost of the specific investments made by i in order to participate in the joint action plan (that is, i always 
at least recoups the cost of its specific investment). The solution assumes that bargaining should provide each player 
with at least a small net advantage, which is the difference between the share of the surplus received and the status quo 
value. As a consequence of additional rationality postulates, these net individual advantages can be identified as such 
that the product of all of them is the maximum among those in the set of the possible outcomes of the cooperation. 
We may say that this is the collective choice function adopted by the members of the coalition, in light of their 
bargaining, to resolve the problem of their joint action. It is coherent with the proportionality of the remunerations 
with the relative utilities, because the ratio in which the shares of the surplus a1/a2 are distributed is proportional to 
the ratio between the marginal variations in the players‘ utilities  U1/U2 = - a1/a2  (Brock 1979, Sacconi 1991, 
1997). On the basis of Nash‘s postulates (1950) and those of the Zeuthen-Harsanyi (cf. Harsanyi 1977), this solution 
expresses a bargaining equilibrium based on individual rationality of the players.      
13 See Brock (1979), and Sacconi (1991). 
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make accurate forecasts about the rational behaviour of others. But what matters for my 
purposes here is that these postulates are a good approximation of rational behaviour in a 
hypothetical (ideal) bargaining situation among stakeholders (for it is a normative model being 
developed here – one no less normative than that of profit maximization). 
 
 
 (Fig.1. A cooperative bargaining game with two players and the Nash solution in a symmetrical case) 
Moreover the outcome of the bargaining game can be interpreted as the solution which is 
coherent with a notion of distributive justice. On the assumption that it is possible to unify the 
units measuring utility, we find that the bargaining solution computed always distributes the 
advantages proportionally to ‗relative needs‘ or to the relative marginal variations in the intensity 
of personal utilities (Brock 1979; Sacconi 1991, 1997). Because it is located on the upper-right  
frontier of the space of the bargaining outcomes, it fulfils the requirement of social efficiency  
(no advantage from cooperation is lost) and at the same time corresponds to an intuitive notion 
of fairness. 
 
 
P 
a1/a2 
 
 a1/a2 
d 
Max(Ui-di) where 
U1/U2 = - a1/a2 
U1 
 
U2 
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6.  The emergence of extended  fiduciary duties from the social contract of the firm 
 
Thus far, the social contract has been presented as a normative deliberative procedure by which 
to identify the terms of an agreement that would be acceptable from an impartial standpoint – 
that is, from the point of view of any whatever stakeholder – so that it can be adopted as a 
standard of behavior by, for example, the mediating hierarchy proposed by Blair and Stout. 
However, the social contract can also furnish a reconstruction – understood as a ‗potential 
explanation‘ – of how bargaining has given rise to a firm with both fiduciary duties towards the 
owners and social responsibility (i.e. further fiduciary duties) towards all the stakeholders. 
   Consider a ‗state of nature‘ prior to the creation of the firm. Bilateral transactions among 
stakeholders regulated by incomplete contracts are subject to reciprocal opportunistic behaviour, 
with the consequence that prohibitive bargaining costs render them inefficient. At the same time, 
the parties to those transactions are entirely unconcerned about the negative external effects of 
their transactions on other agents, who although they do not participate, are nevertheless 
affected. This is a Hobbesian scenario in which the life of economic transactions among agents is  
―solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short‖.14 The stakeholders thus address the problem of 
creating an association whereby all their transactions can be undertaken in accordance with 
agreed-to rules and are therefore not subject to contract-costs, while at the same time the 
negative effects on those who do not participate in the benefits from the transactions are reduced 
to the minimum. The ‗First Social Contract‘ of the firm (pactum unionis) is nothing other than the 
agreement which the stakeholders reach among themselves to set up this association (the ‗just firm‘). 
They negotiate on the association‘s constitution, which consists in a common plan of action 
(joint strategy) to which each of them contributes either by carrying out a positive effort or by 
simply refraining from applying his/her veto. This first social contract of the firm stipulates as follows: 
a. rejection of shared plans of action which generate negative externalities for those not 
participating in the cooperative venture or, if these negative externalities are essential for the 
production of the cooperative surplus, a compensation of third parties so that they are rendered 
neutral; 
b. production of the maximum surplus possible (difference between the value of the product for 
its consumers, who belong to the association, and the costs sustained by each stakeholder to 
produce it); 
                                                          
14 Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan, (1651), part 1, chapter 13.  
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c. a distribution of the surplus which is ‗fair‘, or rationally acceptable to each stakeholder in a 
bargaining process free from force or fraud and based on an equitable status quo, that is, 
considering the surplus net of the specific investments. 
   However, if an attempt is made to reach this form of an ideal association (the ‗just firm‘) which 
eliminates all the participants‘ contract-costs, they arrive in practice to an organisational form 
which is found to be inefficient from the point of view of its governance costs. The stakeholders 
discover, for example, that the general assembly of all members is unable to take coherent 
decisions in a reasonable amount of time. In the absence of a monitoring system, once the 
members of the association have established fair shares of the surplus to be distributed among 
them, they have an incentive to act opportunistically and not to play their part. Coordination 
problems arise on how the joint strategy can be implemented under  changing circumstances, 
which may alter beliefs and  reciprocal expectations asymmetrically. The stakeholders 
consequently draw up a second social contract of the firm (pactum subjections)15 by which they 
constitute, in the proper sense of the term, a governance structure for the association. It is only 
now that the association becomes a hierarchical structure. 
   The second social contract provides that authority should be delegated to the stakeholder most 
efficient in performing governance functions (the taking of residual decisions, devising 
coordination solutions as circumstances change, monitoring, the enactment of sanctions, 
excluding potential free riders, etc.). For this reason, it can also be seen as a contract between the 
stakeholders and those who is given control over the firm (social contract with the firm). After 
comparative examination of the governance costs of each stakeholder, the one with the lowest 
costs is selected and assigned ownership, and is therefore the one to which the right of governing 
the association is delegated (Hansmann 1996). This class, which is remunerated with the residual is 
authorised to delegate some discretionary decisions in regard to running the firm to professional 
director and managers, and to appoint those who are in the authority position of running the 
firm. Prima facie, their authority will be effectively constituted – that is, the delegation will remain 
valid – as long as they comply with what I call 
Narrow fiduciary proviso: the owners are remunerated with the maximum residual revenue possible 
(in forms compatible with the diverse nature of the controlling stakeholder: profits, returns, 
discounts, improved conditions of service, improved conditions of employment, and so on) in 
the light of conditions obtaining in the firm‘s specific market. 
                                                          
15 Interestingly, also Blair and Stout (1999) adopt the analogy between the firm and the two social contracts typical of 
the social contract  tradition.  
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   However, it is evident that this proviso entails that the positions of the other stakeholders 
change (from the ―just firm‖ to just a firm). Formerly co-equal members of the association, they 
are now subject in various ways to the discretionary decisions taken by the stakeholder entitled 
with authority, and by the administrators that it has appointed. Unlike in the standard economic 
theory of the firm, in the social contract  theory the risk of the abuse of authority can squarely be 
faced. The second social contract is therefore conceived in a manner such that this cost of hierarchy 
is forestalled as well. Hence, under the second social contract, the stakeholders agree to submit to 
authority, thereby rendering it effective, if the contract contains the which stipulates that the 
firm‘s new governance structure must comply with fiduciary duties towards all the stakeholders 
(owners and non-owners).   
Extended fiduciary proviso: 
 Towards the non-owners 
 The firm must abstain from activities which impose negative external effects on stakeholders 
not party to transactions, or compensate them so that they remain neutral; 
 The firm must remunerate the stakeholders participating in the firm‘s transactions with pay-
offs (monetary or of other kinds, for example in terms of the quantity, quality and prices of 
goods, services, working conditions, etc.) which, taken for granted a fair status quo, must contain 
a part tied to the firm‘s economic performance such to approximate fair/efficient shares of the 
surplus (assuming that this is positive) as envisaged by the first social contract.16 
 Towards the owners: The firm must remunerate the owners with the maximum residual 
compatible with fair remuneration – as defined by the first social contract – of the efficient 
contributions made by all the other stakeholders. 
What does this hypothetical explanation yield? It yields a definition of the ‗corporate interest‘ of 
the company – that is, the interest that the manager acting in the name of the company must 
serve – which is consistent with the contractarian model. According to this reconstruction, in 
fact, the manager (appointed through the second social contract) has a special fiduciary duty 
towards the owners (or the ‗residual claimant‘) that has delegated authority to him/her (via 
narrow fiduciary proviso). This duty applies, however, only under the constraint that the general 
                                                          
16 Note that meant here is remuneration in utility and not necessarily in money. Put in economic parlance, this 
remuneration consists of the consumer  rent, the producer rent, the worker rent and so on, accruing to each of them 
from the firm‘s transactions. This means that some  stakeholders may not want to receive monetary benefits from 
the firm, but rather improvements in working conditions or in purchasing power, in the quality of goods and 
services, of contractual conditions, etc., to which the shares of the surplus are in any case devoted. 
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fiduciary duties are fulfilled towards all the stakeholders – which is defined via the extended 
fiduciary proviso. We may thus construct the corporate interest by means of a hierarchical 
decision-making procedure which moves from the most general conditions to the most specific 
ones: 
 First step: minimize the negative externalities affecting stakeholders in the broad sense (perhaps 
by paying suitable compensation); 
 Second step: identify the agreements compatible with the maximization of the joint surplus and 
its simultaneous fair distribution, as established by the impartial cooperative agreement among 
the stakeholders in the strict sense; 
 Third step: if more than one option is available in the above defined feasible se, choose the one 
that maximizes the residual allocated to the owner (for example, the shareholder). 
   Hence, the narrow corporate  interest (the one usually advocated by supporters of the 
―shareholder value‖ view) results from a series of steps which select the admissible ways in which 
this interest can be satisfied – that is, those that are consistent with the various constraints 
imposed by the first social contract on the owner‘s behaviour. It should be emphasized  that this 
concept cannot be reduced to that of value maximization for the ‗residual claimant‘ (the owners) 
once constraints imposed by positive contractual obligations have been fulfilled. This is because 
we recognize all contracts are incomplete, and they are always susceptible to opportunism (even 
by those who run the firm), so that it is the entire hierarchical decision procedure which provides 
the basis for satisfying the corporate interest – i.e. the social contract identifies the goals or the 
internal (not merely external) moral constraints that channels managerial discretion. It results 
from satisfaction in sequence of the three requirements set out above and which can be 
summarized as follows: maximize the value for the residual claimant under the constraint of 
complying with the social contract between firm and stakeholders which defines the ‗stakeholder 
value‘.  
 
PART II 
 
7. Implementing the model: regulation and self-regulation  
This and the following sections address the different problem of how the normative model of 
CSR based on the stakeholders‘ social contract of the firm may be implemented through norms 
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supported by endogenous incentives and motivations. The idea is that the normative model of  
multistakeholder corporate governance and objective function is supported by strong 
endogenous incentives and motivations, so that its implementation may rest largely on voluntary 
self-regulatory norms deliberated by companies, and on their decisions to comply effectively with 
extended fiduciary duties owed to their stakeholders.  
Of course, effective CSR self regulation is a viable option only within an institutional and legal 
environment that does not obstruct it. Such obstruction would occur in the case of too narrow 
definitions of the firm‘s objective-function such as that prescribing shareholder value 
maximization as the company‘s only goal – as nowadays to be found in many company laws at 
European level.  Whenever maximizing the joint stakeholder value conflicted even in the very 
short run with immediate shareholder value maximization, these laws would prevent the board 
from deciding to balance stakeholders‘ interests according to the social contract view which 
implies a constrained maximization view (that is, constraining shareholder value maximization 
with the condition of the simultaneous maximization of other stakeholders‘ utility according to a 
bargaining solution).  The  recent 2006 company law reform in the UK is an example of how the 
corporation‘s goals may be enlarged by means of a general and abstract principle in order to 
legitimate the exercise of some balancing decision amongst different stakeholders as well giving 
relevance to the notion of reputation in the long run.17  This is not at all a concrete norm 
prescribing a precise balancing criterion. On the contrary, it is a very general principle that 
enables the company board and governance structure to trade some interests off against others at 
least in the short run. If complemented with an  accountability requirement concerning how the 
board of directors will account for its carrying out implementation of the balancing decisions, a 
regulation like this effectively opens the door to a self-regulatory CSR standard that more 
precisely specifies principles and guidelines whereby the CSR model of governance must be 
implemented. On being asked to account for their balancing decisions, boards would appeal to 
                                                          
17  The 2006 UK company law reform, Art. 172,  states: ―Duty to promote the success of the company:  
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the 
success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other 
matters) to—  
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term,   
(b) the interests of the company‘s employees,  
(c) the need to foster the company‘s business relationships with suppliers, customers and others,  
(d) the impact of the company‘s operations on the community and the environment,  
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct, and  
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company.  
(2) Where or to the extent that the purposes of the company consist of or include purposes other than the benefit of 
its members, subsection (1) has effect as if the reference to promoting the success of the company for the benefit of 
its members were to achieving those purposes‖  
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such principles or criteria in order to justify their behavior to those stakeholders that may be 
disadvantaged by any particular balancing decision. This desirable complementariness between 
legal regulation and soft law or social standard-based self-regulation  can be seen  as very useful 
for the purpose of implementing the CSR social contract model and multistakeholder corporate 
governance.  
Nevertheless the  thrust of my argument is that, once company law does not obstruct proper self-
regulation,  the endogenous beliefs, motivations and preferences of economic agents (companies 
and stakeholders) are the essential forces driving the implementation of the CSR model of 
multistakeholder governance. To put it in game theoretical terms, the normative model is 
implementable in equilibrium. The rest of this paper aims to give substance to this statement.  
First, however, it must be said  that this position  should  not be confused with the standard 
economist‘s view that if CSR is to emerge as equilibrium behavior from endogenous incentives, 
its driving force must be simply enlightened self-interest in the long run. According to this view, 
a self-interested entrepreneur who cares only for his self-interest in the long run (or cares for the 
self interest of the firm‘s owners in the long run – i.e. the shareholders)  would adopt behavior 
that spontaneously satisfies the company stakeholders‘ interests with no need to single out a 
principle of fairness nor to agree on any social contract principles with stakeholders in order to 
state explicitly that  the firm owes a fiduciary duty to them.  Self interest in the long run would 
simply guarantee that the treatment of corporate stakeholders spontaneously simulates a behavior 
fulfilling extended fiduciary duties, thus making any explicit statement of these duties 
superfluous. The social contract would be useless as well,  since in the long run there is  nothing 
like  a conflictual ―state of nature‖  amongst the company‘s stakeholder. On the contrary, we 
would observe harmony of interest amongst them, so that seeking the shareholder interest in the 
long run would also coincide with fulfillment at any time of the stakeholders‘ interest. As a 
consequence, the only goal that must be specified as the proper constraint on managerial and 
entrepreneurial discretion in the management of the firm is the coherent pursuit of shareholder 
value in the long run. Satisfaction of the stakeholders‘ legitimate  interests is seen as simply a side-
effect of this main goal, because they are related to it through a mean-end relation. If one strives 
to achieve the end of maximizing shareholder value, in the long run one will necessarily choose as 
the means those strategies that will also satisfy the stakeholders‘ interests. Hence whilst 
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stakeholders are to be accounted for within the dimension of corporate means, only shareholders 
are recognized as sources for corporate ends. 18 
  This view does not recognize any need for a norm that explicitly states a principle of fair 
balancing  amongst stakeholders. Note that this norm is excluded not only from  mandatory law 
but also from principles of business ethics or self-regulatory standards or codes of ethics, in so 
far as these social norms may be seen as  underhand attempts  to modify or integrate the ends or 
the bottom line whereby the manager must account for his conduct. 
This self-interest-in-the-long-run view is untenable.  First of all, without the explicit statement of 
a CSR norm - be it worked out autonomously by the board of directors or through a social 
multistakeholder dialogue - based on the hypothetical agreement of the company stakeholders, a 
long run self-interested corporate strategy unintentionally simulating a behavior pursuing 
stakeholder value may simply not exist (or become something that the firm cannot be aware of at 
all). Moreover, even if such a behavior in the long run could be worked out as something of 
which the firm might be aware, nevertheless other behaviors in the long run could hence be 
worked out by the company, so that they provided very limited and minimal satisfaction of the 
stakeholders‘ claim of fair treatment.  These further behaviors would not only be preferable to 
the firm‘s owners, they would also command a certain acquiescence on the part of the 
stakeholders – which could be made indifferent between the prospects of giving in to these firm‘s 
opportunistic strategies or staying out of any relationship with it.  We must conclude that the 
simple self-interest in the long run view, translated into the shareholder value in the long run 
doctrine, would imply a large amount of violation of stakeholders‘ legitimate claims and abuse of 
ownership-based authority. 
 By contrast, the self regulatory view defended  here requires the putting in place of explicit 
norms arrived at by social dialogue and multistakeholder agreements, and taking the form of CSR 
governance codes or management standards, voluntarily accepted by firms because they contain 
and specify the terms of the ideal and fair social contract between the firm and its stakeholders. 
They are explicitly formulated in language  (written or oral) and their utterances contain the 
statements of extended fiduciary duties and obligations that the firm owes to its stakeholders. At 
the same time they are voluntarily adhered to, and as far as enforcement is concerned, they are 
                                                          
18 This is probably the opinion of Jensen when he says ―Indeed, it is a basic principle of enlightened value 
maximization that we cannot maximize the long-term market value of an organization if we ignore or mistreat any important 
constituency. We cannot create value without good relations with customers, employees, financial backers, suppliers, 
regulators, and communities. But having said that, we can now use the value criterion for choosing among those 
competing interests. I say ―competing‖ interests because no constituency can be given full satisfaction if the firm is 
to flourish and survive.‖ (Jensen 2001). See also Sternberg (1999). 
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not imposed by external legal sanction  but instead through endogenous social and economic 
sanctions and incentives. In this sense they are self-enforceable explicit norms, put into practice 
essentially by means of endogenous economic and social forces such as reputation effects and 
conformity.  
To understand why an explicit utterance of the stakeholders‘ social contract of  the  firm by 
means of an explicit voluntary CSR norm is so essential for the endogeneity and self-
sustainability of the model‘s implementation, we must consider the four roles performed by explicit 
and voluntarily agreed norms: 
a) the cognitive-constructive role, which answers the question about how the firm works out the set 
of commitments that it can undertake with respect to future events it is aware of not being able to 
predict in any detail, and therefore what types of possible equilibrium behavior the firm can work 
out so that stakeholders may expect them from the firm; 
b) The normative role, which answers the question about what (if any) pattern of behavior and 
interaction the firm and its stakeholders must select from the set of possible equilibrium patterns 
to carry out ex post (according to the answer given to question a), if they put themselves in the ex 
ante position enabling an agreement to be made from an impartial  point of view; 
c) The motivational role, which answers the question about what and how many equilibrium 
patterns of behaviors, amongst those that could emerge ex post from the interaction between 
firm and stakeholder, would  retain their motivational force if firm and stakeholder were able to agree 
in an ex ante perspective on a CSR norm  along the lines of question (b); 
d) The cognitive-predictive role concerning how a CSR norm affects the beliefs formation process 
whereby a firm and its stakeholders cognitively converge on a system of mutually consistent 
expectations such that they reciprocally predict from one another the execution of a given 
equilibrium in their ex post interaction (given that more than one equilibrium point still retains 
motivational force according to the answer to question (c)). Does the norm shape the expectation 
formation process so that in the end it will coincide with what the ex ante agreed principle would 
require of firm and stakeholders? 
The reference that one must keep in mind concerning these four roles of explicit voluntary CSR 
norms and standards are repeated reputation games, and in particular the repeated Trust Game 
that I will introduce in the next section.  
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8. Cognitive /constructive role of a CSR norm: filling the gaps in the game form.  
One basic idea in the domain of CSR implementation is that the incentives related to the 
formation of a reputation can play a key role in a firm‘s decision to endorse and respect the 
model of extended fiduciary duties owed to its stakeholders. If the firm wants to induce its 
stakeholders to enter into cooperative relations, it  develops a reputation. Stakeholders will decide 
to cooperate with the firm if they trust that it will not abuse them. For a reputation to be 
developed, stakeholders must verify that the firm behaves according to a ―cooperative‖ type of 
behaviour and that it does not abuse them when they decide to trust it (i.e. that the firm respects 
what we understand as the fair term of their social contract). In essence, stakeholders must 
believe that the firm is an ―honest  type‖ (i.e. a type which does not abuse its authority). A firm‘s 
reputation for being a certain type increases if evidence is gathered that confirms it is that type. A 
firm that wants to induce the stakeholders‘ cooperation must act so that its behaviour becomes 
indistinguishable from the voluntary discharge of its fiduciary duties towards its stakeholders. 
Otherwise, if the stakeholders observe an opportunistic behaviour, the firm‘s reputation will 
suffer a dramatic setback.  
One way to illustrate the functioning of the reputation mechanism is a simple interactive situation 
representing a transaction based on the fiduciary relation (the Trust Game) between a stakeholder 
A and a firm B (see fig.2). A stakeholder must decide whether or not to trust the firm and enter 
or otherwise into an exchange relation with it.  The firm decides whether or not to abuse the 
stakeholder‘s trust.  As is well known, this game played one shot has just one Nash equilibrium, 
the strategy pair (no-entry, abuse) = (e, a). 
 
   (insert fig. 2 about here) 
 
Things change however when the Trust Game is repeatedly played for an indefinite number of 
times between an infinite series of short-run players A1,…,An  (where n goes to infinitum), each 
one taking part in a single stage-game, and a long run player B taking part in every repetition of 
the basic stage-game. Player B‘s strategies in the repeated game are hence behavioural rules for 
choosing actions at each stage-game as a function of each history of the game until any stage at 
which player B must choose. Payoff functions must rearrange accordingly. Whereas any short-run 
player (Ai) is only interested in  the payoff of the stage-game in which he takes part, the long-run 
player‘s (B) payoff is the infinite sum of the payoffs he gets at each stage. A crucial assumption is 
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that player B is more or less far-sighted (i.e. player B‘s discount rate  for future utilities is more 
or less close to 1).  
As already mentioned, the idea that players entertain beliefs about the possible types of the 
counterparty characterises reputation games. The long-run player is perfectly rational (from a 
strategic point of view) and perfectly informed about the game, but short-run players are not 
perfectly informed and hence are  uncertain about  the ―type‖ of player B. By a ―type‖ is meant a 
commitment to choose a given action under the different contingencies of the game - i.e. the 
action that player B chooses in each stage-game. Hence ―types‖ reflect the idea that player B may 
be  idiosyncratically committed to some rule of behaviour, even if he is uncertain which it is. 
The different types of player B taken as possible by Ai are the following: i) the stage-game 
―rational‖ type, who always chooses the dominant strategy of the stage-game, ii) the type who 
never chooses to abuse (the  honest type), iii) types who variously combine abuse and non-abuse 
randomly by means of different mixed strategies. Player B‘s reputation is the probability assigned 
by each player Ai at every stage to different types of player B. Probabilities are updated according 
to the Bayes rule: at each stage, the conditional probabilities of types change as a function of the 
evidence produced by how the past stage-games have been played by the long-run player. 
Each Player Ai chooses, according to the expected utility reasoning, between e and ¬e.  During 
the first stages of the repeated game players Ai necessarily do not trust . Eventually (say after N 
periods), however, a short run player (say AN+1) may begin to trust player B if a series of Ai before 
him have observed ¬a so many times that the conditioned probability of the ―absolutely honest‖ 
type is updated to the level p* where the expected utility of e becomes higher than ¬e. Player B‘s 
optimal choices follow from this feature of the model, and they define the equilibrium set of the 
repeated game. First of all, player B can decide always to choose the equilibrium strategy of the 
stage game, that is, always a, which induces Ai not to enter for ever. This leads to a repeated game 
equilibrium, because nobody has the incentive to deviate from such choices for the entire 
duration of the game. But  Player B has a different strategy at his disposal. This consists of 
exploiting his awareness of the updating mechanism followed by players A1,…,An. He can choose 
to simulate the behaviour of the ―absolutely honest‖ type until the conditioned probability 
reaches the critical level p*. At this point he calculates whether it is better for him to continue 
playing ¬a - consequently over and over again inducing choices e from players Ai after AN+1 - or  
to defect by choosing a. If  is close to 1 (that is, player B is not short-sighted), then the infinite 
sum of payoffs 2, even if discounted, will more than counterbalance a single chance of winning 
payoff 3 (cf. Fudenberg e Levine 1989, 1991).  
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However, stakeholders can form their beliefs on the firm‘s behaviour (and, consequently, the 
firm can accumulate its reputation of being an ―honest‖ type), only if they can observe without 
ambiguity whether the firm has behaved according to a type. A problem with regard to this 
condition arises when the relations between the firm and its stakeholders take place  in a setting 
where information or knowledge about the firm‘s action is incomplete. Typically, a firm and its 
stakeholders are involved in incomplete contracts situations where a contract does not contain 
provisos covering unforeseen contingencies, so that there is no concrete benchmark against 
which claims of renegotiation can be assessed when unforeseen events occur. Because of 
incomplete knowledge, the stakeholders cannot verify whether the firm has actually behaved 
honestly according to the terms of the contract – in fact, the contract is mute when unforeseen 
events occur.   
Contract incompleteness is not just a curiosity. Repeated reputation games are games that firms 
can play with their stakeholders only in the knowledge context appropriate for the existence of 
the firm itself. According to the neo-institutional thesis adopted throughout this paper, the 
context suited to the firm is one of incompleteness of contracts wherein contractual 
commitments are badly specified or not existent at all with reference to unforeseen states of the 
world. If one takes strategies that the firm will pursue and behavioral types that it will display 
throughout the repetition of a reputation game as coincident with  contractual commitments 
(assuming that they are endorsed only if fair), incompleteness simply implies that commitments are 
unspecified in regard to unforeseen states. But a reputation is the probability that player B will 
comply with given commitments. Hence neither inductive learning about compliance can work 
nor reputation can be accumulated in such states. 
 Voluntary CSR norms, admitted that they are explicitly formulated through general and abstract 
ethics principles of fair treatment and precautionary rules of behavior, state the commitments 
that a reputation mechanism takes as reference point in its working but that a conditional 
contract cannot anticipate in regard to unforeseen events.19 In other words, norms, principles and 
precautionary standards of behavior state the strategies that the firm may pursue in whatever 
state of the world, and they can be taken as the reference point for the formation, confirmation 
or refutation of the stakeholders‘ expectations concerning the company types. A key point 
concerning how abstract principles and precautionary rules of behavior may state commitments 
referred to unforeseen state of the world is the way in which they help manage vagueness and 
                                                          
19 This is an idea basically very akin to that of ―principles of a corporate culture‖ suggested by Kreps (1990), with the 
important difference, however, that I defend universalistic corporate ethics, not the relative-to-context notion of 
―culture‖ (see Sacconi 2000)  
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ambiguity. In fact their statement does not require a complete forecast of a  state of the world in all 
its concrete details. They simply require fuzzy pattern recognition of a state in terms of some abstract 
characteristic related to a general principle, and the following activation of precautionary rules of 
behavior – which are not conditional on ex ante complete descriptions of (unforeseen) states of 
the world and can be activated just by default (Sacconi 2000, 2007) .  
To see how, assume that a general principle of ethics defines as its domain of application the set 
of those situations that have a certain abstract and universalizable characteristic. In order to 
belong to the domain of a general principle, any given state of the world does not need to be 
completely and clearly described ex ante – which would be implausible for unforeseen states. In 
fact the description of unforeseen contingencies is necessarily mute about many concrete 
proprieties that characterize the ex ante representation of foreseen state of the world as these 
properties simply do not occur in an unforeseen state (this is what makes it ‗unforeseeable‘ in the 
strict sense). But as far as abstract, general e universalizable characteristics identified as relevant 
by a principle of ethics are concerned the situation may be well different. In this case the 
description may be not simply mute, but vague (vagueness is the typical trade-off we may face for 
the comprehensiveness of a general and abstract  universalizable principle). This means however that 
unforeseen states of the world will exhibit a vague but quantifiable membership in relation to the set 
identifying the domain of application of the principle (an intermediate degree between 0 and 1 in 
terms of a fuzzy membership function). Indeed, unforeseen states are what make the domain of a 
general principle or norm a fuzzy set.  
So far so good, but what about the firm‘s commitments? Assume that a precautionary rule of 
behavior is stated in order to preempt the occurrence of principle violations. This is not defined 
conditionally on a complete or clear ex ante description of any state wherein it must be 
conditionally implemented. On the contrary it is defined with reference to membership in the 
domain of the general principle, and the commitment to carry out the rule is undertaken 
conditionally on just an ex ante required  degree of membership of any state, foreseen or not, of the fuzzy 
set that defines its application domain. The firm can undertake this commitment without knowing 
all the possible states ex ante, simply by establishing a membership threshold condition which is 
communicable ex ante to the stakeholders. This only requires assuming that whatever state 
(foreseen or not) may occur, both the players will be able to employ the fuzzy pattern recognition 
model of reasoning just illustrated. Satisfaction of the condition on the fuzzy membership 
threshold is shared knowledge ex post because the degree of vagueness of any state in regard to 
the principle can be commonly understood as a matter of fact concerning the ex post state of group 
31 
 
knowledge. But if this were not the case, the ex post degree of vagueness to be assumed as 
relevant by the firm is that expressed by an impartial and non malevolent observer who takes the 
point of view of every stakeholder in turn. Hence the firm can undertake ex ante its 
commitments and to be confident that ex post it will be able to account for them according to 
the stakeholders‘ vague judgment capacity. Note that the inference from satisfaction of the 
required threshold condition to implementation of the stated precautionary rule is default inference. 
It requires one to reason according to the format: ―even if information on the case in point x is 
incomplete and it is no verified truth that this state belongs to the domain of the principle P….it is not 
inconsistent with the knowledge base that xP‖, or ―given satisfaction of the  threshold condition, 
normally a situation like x is such that xP‖ so that  the required rule of behavior must be carried 
out20.  
In order to avoid the consequences of incomplete information on the formation of reputation, 
the firm will therefore explicitly announce and subscribe to a set of CSR abstract and general 
principles whose contents are such to elicit stakeholder consensus, as well as to the explicit 
commitment of conforming with pre-established precautionary  rules when they are put at risk 
(under a vagueness interpretation of risk), which are both known ex ante (before the occurrence of 
unforeseen events) by stakeholders. Thus it is the CSR norm  that enables the cognitive  
mechanism of reputation to function properly. In the absence of such a reference point, 
stakeholders could not develop trust because they would not be able to check whether the firm 
respects whatever commitments. 
A cognitive role is played in the working of a CSR norm as a gap filling device  (Coleman 1992) that 
states the types of behaviors that stakeholders can expect from the firm in situations where 
contracts fail owing to the absence of conditional provisos constraining residual decisions and 
abuse of authority.  This cognitive function is primarily constructive. The game form (Aoki 2007) is 
badly specified under unforeseen situations because contingent strategies are unspecified over 
such states. But norms nevertheless allow by default the inference of how the honest type of the 
firm will behave under these circumstances. In fact these ―strategies‖ are not defined contingently 
on states of the world that the parties are unable to write down in the contract or are even unable 
to foresee. Explicit norms complete the description of the game form by substituting default 
rules of behavior for conditional strategies. These rules are based on the satisfaction of a 
membership condition in the domain of abstract and general ethical principles that are ex ante 
                                                          
20 On logic default reasoning see Reiter (1981); on its uses in game theory see Bacharach (1994), Sacconi (2000, 2007) 
Sacconi and Moretti  (2008) 
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known and always ex post verifiable through a shared understanding of the inherent vagueness of 
the unforeseen contingencies. Once these norms have been stated ex ante in terms of 
precautionary standards of behavior, we are able to say how the firm is expected to behave  in 
whatever unforeseen state that may put a general principle at risk, until a contrary proof is given 
that the principle does not apply to the new situation. In other words, the firm types 
implementing or otherwise strategies of  conformity to norms are described. What is involved 
here is not inductive learning about the probability of an already given set of possible but 
uncertain set of types, but the very conception of the type set itself that contributes to an 
(approximate) description of what may occur in the future. Accordingly, their role is constructive: 
through the agreed statement of voluntary norms, firms and stakeholders construct an approximate 
model of the game form that they will play in states of the world that they are unable to describe 
ex ante in every detail. 
The cognitive (and constructive) function of norms leaves us only half-way in our argument.  A 
well conceived game form allows definition of the players‘ strategy combinations and the 
reputation equilibria wherein the firm may be described as acting in support of its reputation, so 
that after some time stakeholders begin to trust it. Under the usual condition of the long run 
player‘s non myopia, these equilibrium combinations include the firm‘s continuing not to abuse 
the stakeholders and the stakeholders continuing to enter the relation with the firm. However, in 
general, this will be just one of the many possible reputation equilibria of the game. Other 
equilibria will consist in strategy combinations including random compliance with the norm by 
the firm (a mixed strategy) such that the best response of stakeholders is to yield to the firm‘s 
strategy. These equilibria (see fig.3, the Stackelberg equilibrium in particular) admit that a firm has 
been able to accumulate a reputation for mixed levels of abuse that leaves stakeholder indifferent 
between entering or not entering the relation with the firm. In other words, when a repeated 
reputation game is constructively defined in terms of strategies abiding or not abiding with the ex 
ante agreed CSR norm,  it will have too many equilibrium points, not only the preferable 
equilibrium where the firm abstains from abusing stakeholders by strictly complying with the 
norm and cooperates with them at any time (see fig. 3, where the equilibrium set X is depicted as 
the dashed area). The typical game theoretical problem of multiple equilibria arises. But here it turns 
out that CSR norms have three other roles to play in facilitating an equilibrium selection 
consistent with the normative model. 
 
(insert fig.3 about here ) 
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9. The normative role in the selection of an impartial equilibrium.  
By normative role I mean the function of a fairness principle to give impartial reasons for 
singling out a unique equilibrium solution amongst the many possible. This will be a particular 
equilibrium point coinciding with an outcome rationally acceptable by all the participants in an ex 
ante decision on equilibria to be implemented later. Note that here the normative principle is 
used to choose  an equilibrium point within the equilibrium set of the game to be  played  in the 
implementation phase. The perspective is still that of an ex ante impartial choice, but it now 
concerns equilibria, i.e. game solutions that are self-enforceable. Modeling this impartial decision 
simply requires understanding rational acceptability as equilibrium solution invariance in regard to 
symmetrical player replacement (i.e. invariance of the agreed solution under exchange of the 
players‘ positions – again a way to give operability to the  ‗veil of ignorance‘ idea)  
To keep things simple, assume that there are only two players. Consider a standard representation 
of the equilibrium set of a repeated game coinciding with its (convex and compact) payoff space. 
Moreover, take a symmetric permutation of each player‘s place with respect to the set of 
equilibrium solutions of the game, i.e. the symmetric translation of the payoff space Y (see fig. 4) 
with respect to the Cartesian axes representing the players‘ utility functions and payoffs. Hence, 
for every equilibrium point in the original outcome set Y, whatever the payoff equilibrium point 
afforded to player A in the initial representation, the same payoff will be afforded to player B 
under the translated outcome set X, and vice versa.  
 
(Insert fig. 4 about here) 
 
Impartiality simply requires that the accepted solution is invariant under this payoff space 
translation, because the accepted solution must not depend on the strategic position that a player 
occupies in the game. An impartial solution is an equilibrium point that allows each player to 
achieve an outcome which is invariant whatever position a player happens to occupy. By contrast, 
a solution (given a particular representation of the game payoff space) is said to depend on the 
strategic position that players hold in the game if implementing the corresponding equilibrium 
point yields players a payoff that they could not obtain if the same equilibrium point were 
implemented under the symmetric translation of the payoff space - that is, under the symmetric 
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replacement of players with respect to the set of equilibrium outcomes.  We require this 
translation invariance to be satisfied in order for the equilibrium point selected to be normatively 
considered the solution.  
This can be achieved in two ways. First, assume that a player would ex ante accept (under a given 
representation of the payoff space) a certain equilibrium point as the solution, but under the 
payoff space translation this equilibrium point translates into a different point in the payoff space. 
Once the player places have been exchanged, the payoff space translation identifies a symmetric 
point corresponding to the same equilibrium, but this point (a payoffs vector) does not afford 
each player the same payoff as before (simply because it replaces the payoff of the ―fortunate‖ 
player with that of the ―unfortunate‖ one, and vice versa). Under the symmetric translation of the 
payoff space, on the whole players would agree on the same equilibrium point, but payoffs would 
be the symmetric translation of the initial ones, and hence cannot be invariant. 
This fact does not imply that the solution cannot be invariant under the players‘ replacement. 
Invariance can be obtained by assuming that each player randomizes between the two payoffs 
that he can expect at the same equilibrium point when he takes the place of player A and that of 
player B in turn. An expected payoff reflects the required independence of the player‘s choice 
from any  particular strategic position he may hold in the game in so far as the player is able to 
take both the positions (if they are only two) with the same probability.  
Thus an equally randomized solution is consistent with impartiality.21 But in the present exercise 
of impartial choice it raises a question of  feasibility and implementation. This intuition was the 
starting point of Binmore‘s contribution to the theory of social contract (cf. Binmore 1991). 
Equally randomizing between the original representation of an equilibrium point on the one side, 
and its symmetrical translation on the other, identifies a mid-point between two equilibrium 
payoffs vectors, the first belonging to the initial set of equilibrium outcomes, the second to its 
symmetrical translation (all the points generated like this will lie on the bisector out coming from 
the origin, see fig. 5). 
 
(Insert fig. 5  about here) 
 
                                                          
21
 The idea of solution invariance under the permutation of the individuals‘ point of views and the implied  one of 
equally probable combinations of the two payoffs a player gets from a solution and its symmetrical translation in 
Binmore  theory  captures the idea of Rawlsian ‗veil of ignorance‘, which is however thinner than the Rawls‘ model 
itself (1971).  Cf. note 9 above. 
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This may be an equilibrium point on its own (for example in mixed strategies) or it may not be. If 
in correspondence to this mid-point there is an equilibrium point formed by strategies (pure or 
mixed) that in practice the players may carry out in the ex post game, then that equilibrium can be 
selected in order to generate an impartial solution.  The case is different if the ―mid-point‖ results  
only from the convex combination (joint randomization) of two points each belonging to one 
payoff space, whereas the probability combination falls outside both the original spaces and their 
intersection (see again fig.5). Joint randomization, in fact, is an admissible operation within the 
context of cooperative games, where joint strategies (plan of actions) can be randomized by an 
interpersonally valid  random mechanism without fear that individual players will act according to 
separate mixed strategies in practice. But the game that we are considering is  non-cooperative. 
Thus we are not allowed to generate from the original outcome  space and its symmetric 
translation the convex hull of all their components. Save in the case where the initial payoffs 
space is also symmetric by itself, which is a very special case, it follows that the symmetric 
translation of payoffs associated with a given equilibrium point will carry that point into a new 
point that in general will not belong to the original space. Moreover, the equal-probability  
combination of the two points  (a mid point) will not belong to the intersection of the two 
spaces. This means that there is no ex post equilibrium point to which the players may resort in 
order to implement their ex ante agreement. Such an equilibrium is not feasible.  
Nevertheless a second way to satisfy the condition of replacement invariance is still available. It 
amounts to the restriction of selecting the acceptable solution only within the intersection of the 
original outcome space and its symmetric translation. Any selection within this set does not 
create the feasibility problem just considered because any point in the intersection set 
corresponds to an equilibrium point which is always existent as long as it belongs to both the 
original and the translated outcome sets. As before, invariance may be obtained for each player 
by taking as a solution the equally-probable combination of his payoff derivable from an 
equilibrium point and its  symmetric translation.  Such a mid-point will necessarily identify one 
equilibrium that any player can ex post achieve by a feasible pure or mixed strategy as long as it 
belongs to the intersection set.  Binmore convincingly argued that equally probable combinations 
imply the egalitarian solution within the intersection set, and by simply adding the obvious Pareto 
efficiency condition it leads  to the symmetric Nash bargaining solution (see fig. 5 again). This 
solution is identical to singling out the maximin solution with respect to the original payoff space 
- which amounts to vindicating Rawls (1971) in the apparently alien context of a game theoretic 
social contract (Binmore 1991, 1998,  2005). 
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However, to confine our treatment to the context of the repeated Trust Game, we are in a 
particularly favorable situation as far as our ex ante equilibrium selection exercise is concerned. 
With reference to the payoff space of the repeated Trust Game, the simple requirement of 
selecting a solution within the intersection of the basic payoff space and its symmetric translation  
is sufficient for singling out  a unique solution, at least  if the obvious Pareto condition is granted 
(see fig.6).  
(Insert fig. 6  about here ) 
 
Thus we do not have to bother with the ethical intuitions underlying the egalitarian solution and 
the ‗veil of ignorance‘ idea that justifies that of equally probable combinations as expressions of 
fairness. Simply,  if  the solution has to be invariant under the players‘ symmetric position 
exchanges with respect to the outcome set, plus the PO condition, then it cannot be but the 
symmetric Nash bargaining solution of the original game, In fact the intersection set coincides 
with the north-west boundary of the payoff space, which lies on the  45° line from the origin (see 
again fig.6). Because it is reduced to a segment of the 45° line (the bisector), the solution cannot 
but be the only point of this line segment belonging to the Pareto efficient set, i.e. the symmetric 
Nash bargaining solution. Note that the key point for this conclusion is simply that an impartial 
exercise of choice (replacement invariance) must select an equilibrium point within the 
intersection set, that is, an equilibrium point which must exist in any case and hence be 
implementable by each player whatever the position he occupies  in the ex post perspective. A 
stability condition (the solution must lie in the set of those points that correspond to ex post 
implementable equilibria) joined to the weak fairness condition of invariance to players 
replacement is sufficient to derive the egalitarian solution.  Students of corporate governance may be 
struck by the simplicity of this result, which contradicts much of the subject‘s credos22:  
PROPOSITION:  
In order to select an institutional form of corporate governance under the constraint of being 
incentive compatible – i.e. implementable by an equilibrium point – do not bother with wealth 
maximization; instead look at the ―egalitarian solution‖ (in the qualified sense of being the Nash 
symmetric solution within the intersection set resulting from the symmetrical translation of the 
outcome equilibrium set).  
 
                                                          
22 For a detailed exposition of how the dogmas of welfare  maximization and efficiency may permeate all the  
economics of institutions see Kaplow and Shavell  (2002)    
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Thus an explicit normative model including a specific method of impartial reasoning helps 
resolve the multiplicity problem from the ex ante perspective.  But we must not overemphasize 
this result. What would effectively solve the multiplicity problem would be  an equilibrium 
selection theory able to predict the ex post game equilibrium solution so that it is consistent with 
the ex ante solution identified. In other words, selection is ex post effective only if it gives reasons 
to act that fit the ex post reasoning context. Ex post, only common knowledge of the solution, 
i.e. a system of mutually consistent expectations converging on the prediction of a uniquely 
determined  equilibrium point, conveys to each player the appropriate reason to act, because 
choosing an equilibrium strategy amongst many others requires having a clear prediction of other 
players‘ behavior and beliefs. But given the fact that in the ex ante perspective a solution is 
invariant to the players‘ position replacement, there is no logical reason to conclude that it will be 
effectively implemented. The reason that  justifies a particular decision in the ex post game is 
knowledge of what the players will effectively do. Moreover, this knowledge about the other 
players‘ decisions must be consistent with their being symmetrically able to predict our behavior 
and to choose their best response to these predictions. Therefore it is not the impartial selection 
of a desirable ex ante solution but the knowledge of other players‘ de facto behaviors that provides 
the proper reason for acting in the ex post context. And there is no logical implication from what 
is fair ex ante selection  (even if it falls on an equilibrium point) as to what other players will 
actually do. Maybe they will act in accordance with the principle, maybe not. The fair ex ante 
agreement, or impartial choice, does not gives us common knowledge of the ex post behavior of 
players. But if we actually do not know how other players‘ will behave,  we have no reason to 
play a given strategy, even though the fair solution is part of an equilibrium point.  
This is not to say that the ex ante agreement on an impartial solution does not provide any reason 
to believe that players will act according to the same principle in the ex post interaction. This is 
simply a matter of fact or of cognitive psychology, not a matter of logic. Common knowledge, on 
the contrary, is a matter of epistemic logic: this means recursive group knowledge of what 
everybody knows to be true (a truism).23   It may be the case that a given equilibrium is known to 
be played only if each player has many layers of knowledge about every other player‘s action, 
beliefs, beliefs  about  beliefs, etc., that are consistent and justify the prediction that this  
equilibrium will be played.  This state of knowledge can be approximated by a theory of belief 
                                                          
23
 The ex post rationality of Nash equilibrium - implied by the notion of common knowledge-  was already clear in 
Lewis (1968), who also suggested that an agreement could give just an empirical explanation of how a state of 
common knowledge could emerge. He however focused on the different cognitive phenomenon of salience.  On 
game theoretic definition of common knowledge see Binmore, Brandeburger (1990) and Kreps (1990); on the 
epistemic logic of common knowledge see Fagin, Halpern, Moses and Vardi (1996). 
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formation that at last leads us to a stable prediction of any other player‘s equilibrium choice and 
belief (see the predictive function of norms, sec. 11, infra ). Ex ante selection on the contrary does 
not predict how we will actually decide; it only answers the question about what equilibrium 
should be chosen because it is invariant under the individuals‘ position replacement. The step 
from an answer to the question of what equilibrium is fair to an answer to the different question 
of how players will actually behave is a default  inference that some player may in fact make (see 
again sec. 11), but there is nothing necessary about it.  Thus in the perspective of the ex post 
game much has still to be done in order to say that the multiplicity problem has been solved. 
 
10. Motivational role. Are all the equilibria equally capable to provide motivations?  
Any equilibrium point exerts a (limited) motivational force able to command actual behavior, 
which is effective in so far as each player believes that other players will play their strategy 
components of the same equilibrium.  It may be wondered  whether the facts that  a norm has 
been agreed from an ex ante (pre-play) perspective, and exhibits different levels of consistency 
with different equilibria, may affect the motivational force exerted by different equilibria in a 
game. A positive answer would amount to a restriction on the number of equilibrium points that 
have motivational force over the players‘ behavior. In other words, it may be asked whether 
norms can ―refine‖ the equilibrium set of a game in terms of the motivational strength of certain 
equilibria over other equilibria.  
A voluntary CSR norm would in fact perform a motivational function in the restriction of the 
admissible equilibrium set in the event that – having been chosen via a unanimous impartial  
agreement and granted that players expect reciprocal compliance with the norm – it generates an 
additional utility weight to be introduced into the payoffs of the players.  The conjecture is that a 
preference for equilibrium strategies may in part depend not just on their outcomes but also on 
the level of conformity that any equilibrium exhibits in regard to an agreed norm. A conformity 
level must be understood as conditional on beliefs – i.e. conformity depends on one player‘s 
compliance given his beliefs about the other players‘ behaviors and about other players 
reciprocity in compliance, given their beliefs. It follows that the additional psychological payoff 
involved by a given level of conformity is not just an exogenous parameter reflecting the absolute 
motivational force of the desire to be consistent with an agreed norm. The exogenous  
component is also conditioned  by a function of beliefs concerning reciprocal behaviors.  
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Anyway, if the norm generates a modification in the players‘ payoffs in favor of those situations 
wherein no significant deviation from reciprocal conformity occurs, then it may be the case that 
the overall motivational strength reinforcing an equilibrium behavior may be integrated (relatively 
augmented or reduced) by an additional motivational factor that in the end confines overall 
motivational strength only to those equilibria that exhibit significant compliance levels with the 
norm.   
The reference is of course to a different notion of  equilibrium, i.e. the psychological Nash 
equilibrium (Genakoplos et al. 1986) based on conformist preferences (Grimalda and  Sacconi 
2005, Sacconi and Grimalda 2007)24. This results from a modification of the players‘ utility 
functions through integration of preferences with an intrinsic component for norm-compliance, 
seen not as unilateral and unconditioned but as conditioned by beliefs about other players‘ 
reciprocal conformity. The ―refinement effect‖ on the admissible equilibria that this change in 
the equilibrium notion entails is quite surprising (and unexpected). As we will see, the equilibrium 
set of the repeated Trust Games under this revision of the utility function shrinks dramatically to 
the pure strategy equilibria of the repeated psychological Trust Game. 25   
10.1.  The conformist preferences model and the TG 
To begin with, let us informally restate the conformist preference model with reference to the 
Trust Game involving a firm (player B) and its stakeholder (player A). Stakeholder and firm have 
two kinds of preferences, both able to motivate their action.  On one hand (more basic), they 
describe the outcomes of their interaction as consequences, and their preferences regarding 
consequences are defined as consequentialist. These may be not only typical self-interested 
preferences but also altruistic ones. 
This part of the argument is by no means new. The new part instead concerns conformist preferences. 
Players also have preferences defined over states of the world resulting from their interaction, 
which are described in terms of their consistency with an ex ante agreed ethical norm -  where 
―consistency‖ is how far the players‘ strategy choices (jointly a state)  are from the set of actions 
that would completely fulfil the agreed  ethical norm of equity. By norm I mean a principle of 
                                                          
24
 Relevant literature on  psychological games and reciprocity  also includes Rabin (1993), Chareness and Dufenberg 
(2006), Segal and Sobel (2007). 
25 The extensive literature on equilibrium refinements  (see van Damme 1987) may be seen as an indirect approach 
to equilibrium selection in the sense that by specifying additional requirements on the solution  concept it reduces 
admissible elements of the Nash equilibria set. By contrast, psychological games are not usually seen as 
―refinements‖ for they seem to enlarge the equilibrium set with reference to the Nash equilibrium set. This 
refinement effect is hence a peculiar and somewhat surprising result of conformist preferences model within the TG 
context.    
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justice for the distribution of material utilities coinciding with the stakeholders‘ social contract of 
the firm.  
Let us assume that players have just agreed upon a social contract concerning the principle of 
justice that should govern as a norm the distribution of the social surplus produced by means of 
their cooperation through the firm.  Conformist preferences may now enter the picture. 
Intuitively speaking,  a stakeholder will gain intrinsic utility from the simple fact of complying 
with the principle, if the same stakeholder expects that in this way she/he will be able to 
contribute to fulfilling the distributive principle, admitted that she/he expects the other 
stakeholders (or the firm) also to contribute to fulfilling the same principle, given their 
expectations.  
A complete measure of conformist preferences consists in the combination of the following four 
elements through the conformist-psychological component of a player utility function (see 
Grimalda and Sacconi  2005):  
First, a principle T, which is a social welfare function that establishes a distributive criterion of 
material utilities. Players adopt T (the norm) by agreement in a pre-play phase, and employ it in 
the generation of a consistency ordering over the set of possible states , each seen as a 
combination of individual strategies. The highest value of T is reached in situations  where 
material utilities are distributed in such a way that they are mostly consistent with the distributive 
principle T within the available alternatives. Note that what matters to T is not ―who gets how 
much‖ material payoff  (the principle T is neutral with respect to individual positions),  but how 
utilities are distributed across players. Satisfaction of the distributional property is the basis for 
conformist preferences. Let us assume that T coincides with the Nash bargaining function.   
Second, a measure of the extent to which, given the other agents‘ expected  actions, the first player 
by her/his strategy choice contributes to a fair distribution of material payoffs in terms of the 
principle T. This may also be put in terms of the extent to which the first player is responsible for a 
fair distribution, given what (he expects that) the other player will do. It reduces to a conformity 
index assuming values from 0 (no conformity at all, when the first player chooses a strategy that 
minimizes the value of T given his expectation about the other strategy choice) to 1 (full 
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conformity, when the first player chooses a strategy that maximizes the value of T given the other 
player‘s expected strategy choice).26 
Third, a measure of the extent to which the other player (respectively the stakeholder or the firm) 
is expected to contribute to a fair distribution in terms of the principle T, given what he (is 
expected to) expects from the first player‘s behaviour. This may also be put in terms of the 
(expected) responsibility of the other player (i.e. the firm) for generation of a fair allocation of the 
surplus, given what it (is believed to) believes. This reduces to a reciprocal conformity index 
assuming values from 0 (no conformity at all, when the other player is expected to choose a 
strategy that minimizes T given what he expects from the first player) to 1 (full conformity, when 
the other player is expected to maximize the value of T given what he expects from the first 
players) formally identical to the conditional conformity index of the first player . 
Fourth,  an exogenous parameter  representing the motivational force of the agent‘s 
psychological disposition to act on the motive of reciprocal conformity with an agreed norm.  
Steps two and three coalesce in defining an overall index F of conditional and expected reciprocal 
conformity for each player in each state of the game. This index operates as a weight (again 
between 0 and 1) on the exogenous parameter  deciding whether   will actually affect or not  
(and, if so, to what extent) the player‘s payoffs. 27 
                                                          
26 Player i’s personal index  of conformity is  
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where the function fi  (which varies from 0 to –1) measures player i’s deviation degree from the ideal principle T due 
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ib  is player i’s belief concerning player j‘s action,  1iMAX bT   is the  maximum attainable by the function 
T due to whatever feasible strategy player i may choose given i‘s belief,  1iMIN bT  is the minimum attainable by the 
function T due to whatever player i‘s feasible choice is given i‘s belief, and  1, iik bT   is the effective level attained 
by T when player i adopts his k-ary  strategy ik  given his belief about player j’s  action.  
 
27 The overall  utility function of player i with reference to the state  (understood as a strategy combination of 
player i strategy i and the other players strategies -i , is the following  
 
       TFUV iii       
where  
i. Ui  is player i‘s material utility for the state ; 
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Summing up the effect of the different components, if a stakeholder expects that the firm (or 
vice versa) is responsible for the maximal value of T, given what the firm expects about his/her 
behaviour, and he/she also is responsible for a maximal value of T, given the firm‘s (expected) 
behaviour, then the motivational weight of conformity  will enter his/her utility function. That 
is, in the player‘s preference system it will show all the force of the disposition to conform to 
agreed norms,  so that complying with the principle will yield utility (in the psychological sense) 
additional to the material payoff of the same strategy.  In the Trust Game this clearly happens at 
best in the state where the stakeholder enters, the firm does not abuse, and they mutually predict 
these strategy choices.  
Note that if a player cannot improve on the value of T simply by means of his unilateral choice, 
given the expected strategy choice of the other player, then he will be considered completely 
compliant (no deviation from the maximum value of T reachable by his choice can be ascribed to 
his responsibility). This feature of the model depends on the fact that we are considering 
compliance in a non-cooperative ex post context wherein players must be able to  deviate  from 
an agreed norm. Hence, in cases like the Trust Game, if the firm is expected to abuse, the 
stakeholder‘s decision to stay out cannot improve on the value of T and hence the stakeholder, 
being incapable to improve over the status quo, will be considered fully compliant with the 
principle. At the same time, when the stakeholder is predicted to stay out, given his prediction of 
the firm‘s abuse, by the firm by abusing cannot modify the value of T. Thus whichever the firm‘s 
strategy choice, it is fully compliant in this case. The result is that in the (no-entry, abuse)  
equilibrium point of the basic Trust Game we also see the conformity  weight  adding to the 
players‘ payoffs. Under this respect thre is no difference with the case where the stakeholder 
enters predicting that the firm is not abusing, while vice versa the firm refrains from abusing 
given its prediction that the stakeholder will enter.  
By contrast, when the firm is unilaterally predicted to abuse, if the stakeholder enters he would 
minimize T with reference to the alternative choice open to him (no-entry), which scores a higher 
level of T. At the same time the firm misses the opportunity to maximize T given the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ii. i  is an exogenous parameter  that may be any positive number and expresses the motivational force of the 
disposition to comply with an agreed principle or norm; 
iii. T  is a  fairness principle (assumed to be a social welfare function with the specific form of  NBS), whose value 
here is defined for the state ;  
iv. F  is a compounded  index expressing both the agent i‘s conditional conformity and the other individuals‘ 
expected reciprocal conformity with principle T in state  , given player i‘s beliefs of first and second order 
(i.e. beliefs about other players‘ first order beliefs) predicting that state  is in fact the case. 
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stakeholder‘s decision to entry, and hence he will be considered as not complying at all. This 
implies that when the firm unilaterally and successfully abuses its stakeholder no conformist  
preference adds any value to the players‘ material payoffs.  
Last, if the firm chooses a mixed strategy whereby the stakeholder‘s decision between entry or 
non-entry is not influential on the T value, the stakeholder on making any choice would be 
unable to improve the value of T by both entering or not entering - hence by staying out he 
maximises T as well. But if the stakeholder still stays out, no other firm‘s strategy can do any 
better in maximizing T than the one just described, and thus the firm is also completely 
compliant when it abuses. Hence a firm‘s equilibrium mixed strategy responded to by the 
stakeholder‘s no entry strategy implies that conformist weights are added to the player‘s payoffs. 
On the contrary, were the stakeholder willing to enter when the firm adopts the mixed strategy 
(so that by entering he is equally compliant as when staying out), the firm becomes responsible 
for a sharp deviation from full compliance, for it could have chosen not to abuse at all. In fact it 
has not maximized the value of T as it could have done. Maybe this is not the minimum value for 
T, but nevertheless it has produced a significant deviation from full compliance (proportional to 
the distance from the maximum value of T conditional on the stakeholder‘s choice).  Thus, in 
this case the motivational weight  of conformity cannot enter the utility functions of both players 
in all its strength.  
Focusing for the moment only on the choice by the stakeholder, this may dramatically change his 
overall utility calculation in order  to decide whether or not to surrender to a company‘s strategy 
of sophisticated opportunism which manages to keep compliance with the CSR norm to its 
minimum compatible with the stakeholders‘ incentive to entry. Whereas in the iterated Trust 
Game the mixed strategy may reward stakeholders to a sufficient extent to convince them to play 
entry, this is not the case in its psychological game.  A stakeholder will refuse to surrender and 
will prefer a more resolute ‗hard-nosed‘ approach by quitting the relationship (as we have seen, 
this will also set to zero the firm‘s responsibility for any deviation from compliance).  
However, the conformist preference model has much more to say about equilibrium 
―refinement‖ when we consider a case of reciprocal conformism, that is, the case when 
conformist preferences are present on both sides. Consider a small change in the Trust Game 
payoffs completely non influential on its basic logic. The four pure strategy combinations are 
now (no-entry, abuse) and  (no-entry, no-abuse) with material payoffs (1,1);  (entry, abuse) with material 
payoffs (0,5); (entry, no-abuse) with material payoffs (4,4). This is simply useful to understand what 
is meant by calculating the level of conformity in the different states by applying the Nash 
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bargaining solution, which requires maximizing  the product of individual surpluses net of the 
status quo. In our case the status quo coincides with the outcome of the no-entry strategy i.e. (1,1), 
which in fact is the assurance level that player A can grant himself whatever player B‘s choice. 
This payoff must then be subtracted from whatever payoff is used in the calculation of the Nash 
product annexed to any state (strategy combination). The three matrices (see below) then show 
(a) the new TG in normal form, (b) the Nash bargaining product calculated for each pure strategy 
combination needed to measure the consistency of  each state with the combination, and (c) the 
overall payoffs resulting from the addition of the psychological conformist preference weight   
= 2 to the material payoffs where this addition is appropriate.  
   a       a 
   e     4,4      0,5 
e     1,1      1,1  
    Matrix (a):TG normal form  
        Matrix (b): T values at each state 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Matrix ( c) : psychological TG  with conformist utilities included with  = 2  
 
Inspection of matrix (b) shows that if the firm is predicted to play strategy a, the stakeholder 
maximizes T by playing strategy e. If this is known, the firm also maximizes T by playing a, 
since neither strategy is better or worse than a in order to maximize T from the firm‘s point of 
view. Hence in the bottom right cell of matrix (c) the psychological weight  adds to each player‘s 
material payoff. On the other hand if the firm is predicted to play a, then the stakeholder 
maximizes T by choosing e, and if this choice is predicted by the firm, its choice  maximizing T is  
a  as well. Consequently in the top left cell of matrix (c) psychological weights  are also 
present. If the firm plays a the stakeholder will minimize T by e, which is also true if the same 
 a            a 
e (4-1)(4-1) = 9 (0-1)(5-1) = - 4 
e (1-1)(1-1) = 0 (1-1)(1-1) = 0 
              a             a 
  e (4+) = 6, (4+) =  6         0, 5 
e               1,1   (1+) = 3,  (1+) = 3 
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result is seen the other way round (given e, the firm minimizes T by abusing with a). No weights 
must be added in the top right cell of matrix (c).  Last, if the firm is predicted as not abusing, the 
stakeholder minimizes T by staying out with e. Even though the firm is maximizing T when it 
plays a , a zero index of individual conformity (the stakeholder‘s one)  is sufficient to nullify the 
overall level of conformity. Also when this is the case no psychological conformity weights are 
implied in the players‘ payoffs.  
10.2   Mixed strategies and the repeated psychological TG 
Now consider the repeated Trust Game (TG). Recall that its payoff space is the convex hull of all 
the linear (probability) combinations of the three payoffs vectors generated out of the pure 
strategy pairs of the basic Trust Game.  This is the same as representing  the expected payoffs of 
every possible pair of pure and mixed strategies of the two players in the basic Trust Game. In 
fact the player‘s i expected payoff for a mixed strategy is formally the same as the average payoff of 
the player‘s i repeated strategy of the repeated game that employs alternatively the two player‘s i 
pure strategies of the stage game with a given frequency, generating the three stage game 
outcomes (1,1,), (4,4), (5,5) according to the frequency of the two players‘  choices. The 
cumulative payoff of this repeated strategy, given a certain pure (or mixed) response by the 
second player, can be equated to the average payoff of a cycle along which player i gets each of 
the three stage-game payoffs a given proportion of times out of the total number of times in the 
cycle (granted, of course, that along the game each repeated strategies pair of the two players 
repeatedly enters a cycle with the same pattern of outcomes and the same average payoff value 
for each player). Hence it is simple to see that a firm‘s mixed strategy that employs the two pure 
strategies a and a with probability 0.25 and 0.75 respectively against - to keep things simple - 
the  stakeholder‘s pure entry strategy e, affords the firm and the stakeholder expected payoffs 
(0.25×4+0.75×5 = 4.75) and (0.25×4+0.75×0 = 1) respectively, equal to the average values 
attached to a repeated strategy whereby the firm plays the stage-games strategy a the 75% of 
the times and the stage-games strategy a  25% of the times assuming – to keep things simple 
again – that the stakeholder always responds with the stage-game strategy e. Obviously it is true 
that in the one-shot TG  no mixed strategy is a best response for the firm. But in the repeated 
TG we know this is no longer true. In fact, the firm may create a reputation (along, say, the first 
N repetitions of the game) to be a type that uses the strategies a and  a in a given frequency, such 
that the stakeholder‘s best response is ―always e” until by repeated observations he realizes that 
the  frequency is respected, but sanctioning by ―e  forever‖ were it to become clear that the 
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frequency is not respected. This induces the firm to stick to its repeated strategy, mixing a and 
a according to the given frequency. 
But then we must consider the payoff space of the psychological game that can be generated 
from that of the Trust Game when all the expected payoffs of mixed strategy pairs are accounted 
for. This psychological TG in pure and mixed strategies has the same payoff space as the 
repeated psychological TG wherein the average payoffs of each repeated strategy – which 
employs the pure strategies of a player in a given frequency – is identical to the expected utility of 
the mixed strategy using the corresponding probability mixtures. Hence we may ask what 
happens to the mixed strategy equilibrium points of the corresponding standard repeated TG. 
Before answering this question, we must define a way to calculate the expected psychological 
utility of any mixed strategy. Take the point of view of the stakeholder (call him A) when he 
predicts the firm (call it B) will choose a mixed strategy, for example    
   B
0.6 ={(0.6, a); (0.4, a)} 
A believes that, if he enters by playing the pure strategy e, two states (e, a) and (e, a)  may 
occur,  so that two different values of the principle T – i.e. (9) and (-4) – can arise, each of them 
weighted with the probabilities  0.6 and 0.4. of the respective states. Hence the expected Nash 
bargaining product generated by B‘s mixed strategy B
0.6, given A‘s entrance, is  0.6×9 + 0.4×(-4) 
= 3.9 whereas if A does not enter, the expected T value is 0 as usual. Given B
0.6, player A‘s 
strategy e maximizes T in respect of any other pure or mixed strategy by A, whereas e 
minimizes it. It turns out that player A‘s conformity indexes are 1 and 0 for his pure strategies 
respectively. 
On the other hand, player B‘s conformity indexes are the following. Assuming that B believes A 
will enter,  B does not maximize T by playing the strategy B
0.6, because it is obvious that no-
abuse would do better in terms of T. Nor does playing the mixed strategy minimize T, which in 
fact would happen by playing  a. As a result, B‘s conformity index for strategy B
0.6 actually is a 
somewhat intermediate value  0.61. But  assuming that B believes that player A will not enter by 
e, then B‘s mixed strategy B
0.6 will  maximize T no less than any other B‘s strategy. B‘s 
conformity index under this hypothesis is hence 1. To conclude the example, consider A‘s 
respective expected material payoffs from playing e or e against the mixed strategy B
0.6  
EUA(e, B
0.6) = 2.4,  EUA(e, B
0.6) = 1 
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Similarly, player‘s B expected material payoffs from playing the mixed strategy against the two 
pure strategies of player A are  
EUB(e, B
0.6) = 4.4,  EUB(e, B
0.6) = 1 
Since the conformity indexes of  players A and B for the strategy pair (e, B
0.6) are 1 and 0.61 
respectively, the psychological conformity weight  will enter the players‘ utility functions 
accordingly.  - i.e. by a value (1)(0.61) . Given  = 2 , the weight of the conformist motivation is 
1.22 and the overall utility payoffs of players A and B are  3.62 and 5.62 respectively.   
In the repeated psychological TG, these payoffs correspond to the following pair of player B‘s 
and player A‘s repeated strategies:  player B employs his pure strategies a and a repeatedly with 
frequency 0.6 and 0.4 respectively, and by this repeated strategy tries to convince player A (or the 
sequence of short run players that participate in the repeated game in the position of A) that he 
will stick to this frequency forever. Player A decides to play repeatedly his entry strategy e as long 
as he does not see player B employing abuse with a frequency higher than 0.4, but if this 
frequency is exceeded he will switch to ―e forever‖. Since player A‘s threat seems quite 
convincing, player B plays ad infinitum his above-defined mixed repeated strategy. Assume that 
exactly 100 times are sufficient to say that the required frequency has been verified so that - if the 
players adopt the pair of repeated strategies described above - 100 times is a cycle that repeats 
more and more along the repeated game with always the same proportion of stage-games having 
outcomes (e, a) and stage games having outcome  (e, a).  The average payoffs for this pair of 
repeated strategies - including the psychological component – is the vector (3.62, 5.62). It would 
seem to be a good incentive for player A to yield to player B‘s mixed abuse strategy, but before 
saying anything about equilibria we have sill to wait for a while.  
Following the method mentioned above, under the hypothesis   = 2, it is in fact possible to 
account for the entire payoff space of the psychological Trust Game including mixed strategies as 
well (see fig. 7).  
 
(Insert fig. 7 about here) 
 
First note that the status quo point (1,1) – the only Nash equilibrium of the basic one-shot TG and 
moreover an equilibrium of the repeated TG –  is translated toward North-East along the bisector 
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to a point with overall utilities (3,3), which is also a psychological equilibrium of the new game. 
At the same time, thanks to the motivational conformist weights  = 2, the outcome (4,4) where 
the Nash bargaining product is maximized translates toward North-East to the point (6,6), which 
is also a psychological equilibrium. Recall that both these psychological equilibria correspond to 
Nash equilibria of the repeated TG, so that these two equilibria are certainly preserved under the 
payoff change provided by conformist preferences.   
In regard to player B‘s mixed strategies, it can be seen that the entry strategy  e of player A 
cannot be rewarded with any additional psychological conformist utility until the expected Nash 
Bargaining product - i.e. the expected value of T associated with any particular probability 
mixture of the two pure strategies a  and a - is not positive, granted player A uses e. This 
necessarily happens until a mixed strategy associates the pure strategy  a  with a probability high 
enough to give the respective T value ( 9) a weight able to counterbalance the T value of a (i.e. -
4), so that the T expected value exceeds the T level fixed by the ―status quo‖ no-entry strategy 
(which is 0). Hence, within player B‘s continuous set of probability mixtures of two pure 
strategies a and a, the relevant threshold is fixed by player B‘s mixed strategy that scores an 
expected Nash product no different from the T value of staying out.  As long as this threshold is 
not exceeded, psychological payoffs do not add any values to the material payoffs of both players 
A and B, because entering by e minimizes the T value and exhibits zero conformity level. This is 
true also when player B adopts a mixed strategy that makes him partially, and hence positively, 
compliant. In fact until player A‘s choice to enter by e exhibits a zero conformity index, the 
overall conformity level is also nil for both players and no psychological payoffs  may add to their 
material payoff.    
This does not means that psychological utilities are not at work for these mixed strategies. 
Simply, the psychological component adds to the payoffs of strategy pairs like (no entry, mixed 
strategy), which is the same as for the strategy pair (no entry, abuse), i.e. (3,3). This means that the 
best responses for these cases is e, which gives player A an overall payoff 3 whereby player B‘s 
mixed strategies and the pure strategy a become indifferent as they both give B the same overall 
payoff  3.  
As an example, consider the mixed strategy  B
0.25 ={(0.25, a); (0.75, a)}. The expected Nash 
bargaining product (i.e. the T value) is negative (−0.75) for the pair (e, B
0.25), whereas T is 0 if 
player A chooses e. Hence it is obvious that A maximizes T by choosing e , with conformity 
index 1,  whereas the conformity index for choosing e is 0. As a result, by entering  with e, player 
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A can only get the expected overall payoff 1, which - due to the probability mixture provided by 
B
0.25 - is no different from the material payoff of staying out. But  by staying out with e he gets 
an overall payoff 3, because the psychological conformist weight 2 now adds to this strategy 
material payoff. Thus A‘s best response is obviously to stay out. As far as player B is concerned, 
the mixed strategy B
0.25  against e gives a payoff equal to its material payoff 4.75. When player A 
does not enter against  B
0.25 , B‘s payoff benefits from the psychological conformist component 
(becoming 3) as well as from any other choice by B when he knows that A plays no-entry.  
Note the importance of the mixed strategy  B
0.25. This is player B‘s Stackelberg mixed strategy 
that, from the one-shot TG, would correspond to the preferred (by the firm) equilibrium strategy 
of the repeated TG. It identifies exactly the equilibrium  point of the repeated TG which would 
be the most obvious choice from the point of view of player B were he able to select the solution 
of the game by himself. It is noticeable, however, that the pair (e, B
0.25)  is not an equilibrium in 
the psychological TG even if player B‘s material payoff is quite high. Given strategy B
0.25 neither 
is player A‘s best response e, nor is player B‘s material payoff 4.75 sufficient to make the strategy 
B
0.25 preferable to a when A plays e, simply because, due to a sufficiently high  associated with 
the psychological equilibrium in pure strategies (entry, no-abuse), playing a pays B more (6). 
The threshold that allows mixed strategies to gain support from psychological conformist utility 
is reached at the mixed strategy  B
0.307 ={(0.307, a); (0.693, a)}. Actually, given this mixed 
strategy, the expected value of T is zero for any strategy choice by A, so that A is fully conformist 
by choosing either e or e. At the same time playing the mixed strategy is partially conformist 
also for player B, because the minimum T value  given A‘s entrance would be obtained by playing  
a. Hence, under the pair (e, B
0.307), psychological utilities add to both the players‘ material payoffs 
(1.3, 4.7) generating an overall payoff vector (1.84, 5.31). But it is important to note that adding a 
bit of psychological utility does not mean that this strategy combination becomes a psychological 
equilibrium. Although it is true that player B‘s mixed strategy B
0.307 grants a positive overall 
payoff to A‘s entry strategy, the player A‘s overall payoff from no-entry (3) is still higher than the 
overall payoff (1.84) from giving in to player B‘s mixed strategy. This is due to the incomplete 
conformity level of strategy B
0.307 when player A chooses e. B‘s full conformity would be reached 
by the strategy a, whereas B
0.307 scores only the conformity index 0.31. This affects the 
psychological conformist component of player A‘s overall payoff  for strategy e, which is lower 
than for e. 
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Now consider mixed strategy B
0.39 ={(0. 0.39, a); (0. 61, a)}. With this small increase in the 
probability of strategy a things finally seem to change. Player A with overall payoff 2.36 
benefits substantially from the psychological conformist utility of his entry strategy e,. At the 
same time, as typically happens when a pure strategy is surpassed in its conformity index,  player 
A‘s conformity index of no-entry drops to zero since choosing e given  B
0.39 would minimize 
the value of T in respect of the alternative entry strategy (and also any other mixed strategy). 
Hence also player A‘s overall utility for the no-entry strategy e dramatically drops to 1 (just the 
material payoff).  Moreover, for the pair (e, B
0.39) the overall payoff of player B contains a 
substantial psychological conformist component such that his overall payoff now reaches 5.41, 
whereas if player A were to choose e player B‘s payoff would be reduced just to his material 
payoff 1, since the conformity index of player A‘s strategy e is zero (though B‘s index remains 
positive). But note that this does not imply that we are at an equilibrium point. Even though 
entry is player A‘s best reply to player B‘s mixed strategy B
0.39, this strategy is not reciprocally 
player B‘s best response. The perfectly compliant strategy a would do better in terms of 
conformity index, so that it scores an overall payoff 6 higher than the mixed strategy. 
This suggest a general fact about the model. In fact, consider again the mixed strategy    
 B
0.6 ={(0.6, a); (0.4, a)} 
As we know, player A‘s conformity index if he uses strategy e against B
0.6 is 1, whereas the mixed 
strategy‘s conformity index is 0.61. The annexed overall payoffs are (3.62, 5.62) respectively. 
Even though high psychological conformist utility enters both the players‘ payoffs this is not 
enough to define reciprocal best responses at (e, B
0.6) since, given player A‘s entry strategy, 
player B‘s best reply is again no-abuse at all with its overall payoff 6.  
10.3  Equilibrium set of the psychological repeated TG 
In order to give a general assessment of the two players‘ best reply sets in the psychological TG 
assume that  is high enough for the pure strategy equilibrium (e,a) to exist. Call En|e(A,B) the 
expected Nash Bargaining Product corresponding to player B‘s n-ary  mixed strategy B
n
  (where 
the index n corresponds to the probability weight assigned to the pure strategy a) given player 
A‘s  strategy e. Hence let A,B  denote a generic Nash bargaining product. Last, call ―status quo‖ 
the material payoff granted by A‘s pure strategy e. The relevant facts about the psychological 
TG are the following:  
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 Case 1, B
n
  with n > 0 s.t. E
n|e(A,B) < 0, i.e. such that the pure strategy e induces A,B = 
0 > E(A,B)
n, the pure strategy e does not add any psychological conformist utility to player 
A‘s material payoff, whereas the pure strategy e adds the psychological conformity weight  
to the ―status quo‖ material payoff. Hence player A‘s best reply is e whereby any mixed 
strategy in this case is as good as strategy a to player B. The equilibrium for this case is the 
psychological equilibrium point (e, a). This equilibrium is weak since every mixed strategy 
in this case gives player B the same overall payoff as a. 
 Case 2, B
n
  with 0<n<1 s.t.  E
n|e(A,B) > 0, i.e. such that the pure strategy e induces A,B 
= 0 < E(A,B)
n, each pair (e, B
n
 ) adds some psychological conformist utility to both players‘ 
material payoffs, whereas the pure strategy e reduces player A to the ―status quo‖ material 
payoff. This follows from the minimal conformity index of  strategy e , while in this case 
mixed  strategies B
n
  have positive conformity indexes strictly less than 1. Thus for both 
players A and B there is an intermediate overall index F of conditional and expected 
reciprocal conformity. In this case player A‘s best reply is strategy e. Nevertheless, against 
strategy e player B‘s best  is a. In other words, as little as player B‘s psychological 
conformist utility of a mixed strategy B
n
  is positive,  player B‘s pure strategy a against e (or 
whatever mixed strategy by player A) induces a psychological conformist payoff higher than 
B
n
 , so that player B has an incentive to deviate from B
n
  to a. When this occurs, obviously 
player A has no reason to change his choice and the equilibrium point is (e, a). 
 Case 3, for a single 0<n<1   B
n
  such that E
n|e(A,B) = 0, i.e. such that the pure strategy e 
induces A,B = 0 = E
n|e(A,B). In this case both the strategy pairs (e, B
n) and (e, B
n
 ) add 
positive psychological conformist utility to the material payoffs of both the players A and B. 
Nevertheless, player A‘s overall payoff gained from (e, B
n) strictly dominates his overall 
payoff  gained from (e, B
n
 ) since, whereas the two pure strategies e and e score the same 
conformity index, the case of player B‘ conformity indexes  is quite different. Player B against 
e cannot do any better than play B
n
 with conformity index 1, but given e the strategy B
n 
conformity index is strictly less than 1, which is the conformity index of his pure strategy a. 
Since the strictly less than 1 conformity index of strategy B
n
 directly depends on the required 
probability value n, which also affects the expected material utility of player A for (e, B
n), 
this correlation is crucial in this case. It turns out that the greater player‘s A payoff gained 
from (e,  a), the smaller the probability required for the A,B indifference, but also the 
52 
 
smaller the resulting player B conformity index for B
n. Thus a player B‘ small conformity 
index at the same time affects negatively (via a small probability) player A‘s material expected 
utility - since a small probability of (e,  a) will counterbalance its high payoff - and also  
makes the strategy e psychological utility increasingly lower than the strictly dominant 
psychological utility of strategy e. The resulting equilibrium point of this case is still (e, a). 
Boundaries between the three cases are established by the distribution of material payoffs 
associated with any mixed strategy, and in particular how much surplus it assigns to player A. As 
long as a mixed strategy overwhelmingly advantages player B over player A, the T expected value 
of the mixed strategy pair (e, B
n) cannot exceed that of player A‘s staying out. This is so not just 
because A is dissatisfied with his material outcome, but because of the insufficient conformity 
index of such mixed strategies. When a mixed strategy  B
n instead offers a substantial share of 
the material surplus to player A, it becomes the most conformist solution, and then provides 
psychological utility to both the players against a loss of material payoff to B. But at this point 
player B is able to compare the psychological utility of incomplete conformity against that of full 
conformity. It is evident that if the parameter  is high enough to guarantee the existence of the 
psychological equilibrium in pure strategies, then it is also true that player B always prefers the 
pure strategy of full conformity. 
Of course, much also depends on the  exogenous parameter of the two players (granted they are 
symmetric, which is not necessarily true). Were  too low, the situation would not change in 
regard to the basic TG and the repeated TG. But if  is greater than player B‘s payoff difference 
between abusing and not abusing (given player‘s A entry),  its motivational effectiveness 
necessarily becomes maximal for the strategy of full conformity. In general it biases the game 
towards excluding that mixed strategies can give rise to psychological equilibria. Actually, a look 
at the payoff space reveals a single North-East vertex where both payers have highest payoffs 
than anywhere on the eastern frontier where all the expected payoffs generated by mixed 
strategies lie. In short, given its overall payoffs, the pair (e, a) strictly dominates any other 
strategy pair involving a mixed strategy B
n
 and player A‘s entry strategy e. We have argued 
enough to state the following  
PROPOSITION:  
Given a TG with pure and mixed strategies, whereby a psychological game with conformist 
preferences is defined, so that the motivational exogenous parameter  is great enough to 
guarantee the existence of a psychological equilibrium in correspondence to (e, a),  the game‘s 
psychological equilibria are only the two in pure strategy (e, a)  and (e, a), and no equilibrium 
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points in mixed strategies exist. In particular no player B mixed strategy is the best reply  to 
player‘s A pure entry strategy e, even if the entry strategy e is player A‘s best reply to the mixed 
strategy of player B.  
 
From this proposition follows the  
COROLLARY:  
In the repeated psychological TG, psychological equilibria ―refine‖ the equilibrium set of 
corresponding repeated TG in a discontinuous way in function of the increase of the motivational 
exogenous parameter , so that 
 Given any  such that in the one-shot psychological TG there is no psychological equilibrium in 
correspondence to the pair (e, a),  then the psychological equilibrium set is the same as the 
equilibrium set of the repeated TG due to the sole effect of material payoffs (see fig.8 north-east 
boundary X). 
 If the value of  is such that in the one-shot psychological TG player B‘s overall payoff derived 
from the strategy combination (e, a) is no different from the overall payoff derived by B from 
the strategy combination (e, a) - so that a weak psychological equilibrium exists for (e, a), then 
in the corresponding psychological repeated TG the psychological equilibria constituted by a 
mixed strategy B
n and the pure strategy e have all the same player B expected payoffs, and thus 
they are all weak equilibria. Given the continuity of the probability mixture set over the two pure 
strategies a and a, the value of  such that this is true is unique (see fig.8 north-east boundary 
Y). 
 If   is such that in the psychological one-shot TG in correspondence to the pair (e, a) there is a 
strong psychological equilibrium, then in the repeated psychological TG there are no 
psychological equilibria in mixed strategies and the psychological equilibrium set  dramatically 
shrinks to the only two pure strategy equilibrium points (e, a) and (e, a). (See fig. 8 north-east 
boundary Z). 
 
(Insert  fig. 8 about here) 
 
The  corollary is important because it is in this context that we see our result. As far as the payoff 
space of a one-shot basic TG is concerned,  also mixed strategies are not equilibria. If B adopts a 
mixed strategy that induces A to enter, B immediately has an incentive to deviate to the abuse 
strategy since the mixed strategy is not the best reply to A‘s choice to enter. On the contrary, if 
the payoff space is seen (as in the corollary) as the convex set of all the average payoffs for 
repeated strategies in  a repeated TG, then represented within this space may be the average 
payoffs of player B‘s repeated strategies mixing the two pure strategies  a and a according to 
some pre-established  frequencies. Thus, if player B is able to accumulate a reputation of being a 
player that unfailingly  plays one such strategy, he will have no reason to deviate if player A 
adopts a conditioned strategy of entrance like ―as long as my observations are compatible with 
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the hypothesis that B is playing a and a according to the given pre-established frequency I will 
continue to enter by e, but were I to realize that my observations are incompatible with that 
frequency, I will switch to e forever‖.  In fact, given player A‘s conditioned entrance strategy, 
player B verifies that maintaining his reputation of being the type of player who uses the repeated 
strategy ―abuse no more than x% of the time, and no abuse for the rest of the time‖ is profitable 
since it allows him to gain a certain portion of the surplus. Summing up, player B has the 
incentive to keep abuses at a certain frequency  in order to support his reputation of being the 
relevant type.  
Quite different however is the situation when the repeated psychological TG is considered. In 
this case, a payoff space identical to the convex hull of all the payoff pairs deriving from pure 
strategy combinations in the one-shot psychological TG is generated by taking the set of all the 
average payoffs pairs given by combinations of the two players‘ (pure and mixed) repeated 
strategies. What happens is that  if player B has chosen a repeated mixed strategy whereby he has 
been able to accumulate a positive reputation which induces player A to enter for the first time, 
then he immediately recognizes the incentive to switch to a strategy that employs the strategy a 
with higher frequency. This feature of the repeated psychological TG completely changes the 
best response structure with regard to the standard  repeated TG. In the standard case, player B 
has a clear incentive to maintain his strategy once he has been able to build up a reputation for 
being a mixed type, since abusing less would give away a larger part of the surplus to player A, 
while abusing more would induce player  A to carry out his sanction. At the same time, player A 
has a strong incentive to monitor and sanction the relevant possible deviation by player B.  In the 
repeated psychological TG, by contrast, player B‘s best reply to player‘s A entry is to deviate from 
any mixed strategy B
n  to a. But if player B deviates to a strategy more concessive to him, A 
certainly does not have any reason to punish him. Thus  the repeated mixed strategy equilibrium 
of the basic repeated TG is destabilized. Summing up, any mixed strategy by player B that 
induces player A to enter, according to player B‘s point of view is dominated by the pure strategy 
―always a‖, so that a rational player B would never strive after a reputation such as being 
committed to the mixed strategy  B
n . From the outset he  would prefer to develop the dominant 
reputation of being an ―always a” player.  
From this the conclusion follows that even though generating a psychological game from a basic 
Trust Game enables determination of new equilibrium points (i.e. to pass from only one 
equilibrium to at least two), when the change involves a step from the one-shot TG to the 
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repeated TG, then transforming the payoff space by means of conformist preferences has a 
powerful effect in reducing the psychological equilibria to a subset of the Nash equilibria. It 
remains, however, that the equilibria are two. Which of the two is to be selected? 
 
11. The cognitive/predictive function of norms and ex post equilibrium selection 
 It is a somewhat disturbing truth in the foundation of game theory that the  existence of ―one 
sole‖ Nash equilibrium point, even if it is in dominant strategies, does not assure sufficient 
conditions for deducing the rational solution of the game (cf. Bacharach 1987). In order to 
predict that rational players will carry out their  equilibrium strategies, something more is needed: 
the system of reciprocally consistent expectations that justify the prediction  that players will 
adopt exactly that combination of equilibrium strategies. A player rationally chooses an 
equilibrium strategy only when he has formed the backing expectation that the other players will 
also play the equilibrium strategies components of the same equilibrium point, so that his choice 
is rationally justified as his best response to them. Moreover, this backing expectation must be 
consistent with the assumption that also the other players act with similar backing expectations. 
Hence, in order to be considered as a solution that each player will rationally play, an equilibrium 
point even if unique needs previously to be predicted as the set of strategies that every player will 
play, i.e. it must be previously  known by each player as the description of strategies that all the other 
players will effectively carry out, given that they all expect exactly these strategies from one 
another (this amounts to the somewhat circular statement that a Nash equilibrium is a solution as 
far as the solution – i.e. the equilibrium point to be the solution – is common knowledge). 
Where can this previous knowledge come from? The simple existence of an equilibrium does not 
entail that it will be played since, again, in order to infer that it will actually be put into practice a 
player needs some reason to believe that other players besides himself have already formed the 
expectation that everybody will play it. In other words, a process of expectation formation 
converging on this mutually consistent system of beliefs and prediction must be worked out even 
in the apparently simple case that ―one sole‖ equilibrium point exists. Indubitably, therefore, a 
more pressing problem of expectations formation exists if the possible equilibrium points are 
many. Without answering the question as to which of them is mutually expected by players to be 
the actual solution of the game, there is no way to say that players have any incentive to play a 
particular strategy combination,  even if it is an equilibrium point of the game.  
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To return to our context, recall that the foregoing section concluded that at most two Nash 
psychological equilibria remain as solution candidates once the game has been transformed into a 
psychological game through the ex ante agreement on a CSR norm and the introduction of 
conformist motivations. Two, however, are enough to create significant uncertainty about the 
actual solution. Though one of these equilibria properly corresponds to the ex ante agreement on 
a fairness principle (the  Nash Bargaining Solution is maximized by the outcome (4,4), this is not 
enough to say that it is the predicted solution of the ex post game. 
In order to solve the problem, the ex ante ―should-be‖ agreed solution should also be known as 
the ex post de facto implemented set of strategy choices. Any player knows that a strategy 
combination is implemented only if this knowledge is consistent with the prediction that any 
other player also believes that everybody will in fact play that equilibrium. Could the fact that we 
have ex ante decided a principle corresponding to an equilibrium be enough to create this general 
expectation? It could, but it is important to realize that there is no necessity in this inference. 
What we decide to do in order to be impartial in the ex ante perspective is not necessarily what 
we will actually do in the ex post perspective. Moreover, it is not necessarily what other players 
will do in the ex post situation. This inference would be unwarranted from a logical point of 
view. Recall in fact that also the motivational force of conformist preference - driving players to 
conform with an ex ante agreed principle – operates conditionally on the  previous expectations 
that also the counterparty will reciprocate compliance. Hence the existence of a previous system 
of mutual expectations must also be granted in the context of psychological equilibria.  
Here one appreciates the role that norms play in a cognitive process of belief formation 
converging on the mutual prediction across players that a given psychological equilibrium will be 
de facto executed. This role consists in a two-tier answer. At a first stage it is suggested that if each 
player has actually adopted an unanimous impartial agreement in the ex ante perspective, then he 
will get to hold at least one mental model of a decision maker (at least himself) who plans at a 
moment in time to act in accordance with the terms of the agreed course of action.28 
Notwithstanding the genuineness of the intention, agreeing on a set of actions to be carried out 
later in fact implies making a plan on some ensuing action which is simply the behavioral content 
of the statement of agreement. In order to stipulate that ―we will act in a certain way later on‖ – 
which may be seen as the content of a generic agreement – each player at least must have in mind 
the mental model of an agent who will act in that certain way later on, where the ―way‖ is the one 
signed in the agreement. What could otherwise be meant by finding a strategy combination that is 
                                                          
28 On mental models see Johnson-Laird (1983), Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991),  Dezau  and North (1994).  
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an equilibrium point invariant under the players‘ position replacement, but having in mind a 
model of an agent who, without going against his incentives, behaves ex post exactly in the same 
way whatever  his  position in the game?  
This is not a reason to say that if this mental model is admitted then it follows that the player will 
actually carry out the correspondent action, nor is it a reason to say that if the existence of such a 
mental model is true for other players, then they will in fact carry out the corresponding actions. 
This is a matter of  approximate and default reasoning, not one of pure logic or necessity (Reiter 
1980, Bacharach 1994, Sacconi and Moretti 2008).  The model is derived from introspection, 
because the player himself is a rational agent who has been able to plan action in accordance with 
the behavioral content of the statement of agreement. The paradigmatic case whereby the model 
is derived by generalization is that of the agent himself. Let us therefore simply state that a player 
holds in his mind the mental model of a rational agent (himself) who acts according to the 
behavioral content of the statement which is the term of agreement. 
Assume, moreover, that mental models are necessarily used in order to figure out possible 
situations and predict them (i.e. no future behavior can be outguessed without a mental model of 
an agent performing the corresponding behavior). And hypothesize that at a point in time no 
further mental model of a rational agent comes to the mind of our players but that  of an agent 
who will act in a certain way later on. If no contrary evidence is thus far forthcoming about the actual 
behavior of other players, the only way that an agent can simulate the other players‘ choice is to 
resort by default to his own mental model of a rational agent. By default, then, the same mental 
model is used to simulate every players‘ reasoning and behavior. This simulation can be recursive, 
so that a player uses his mental model not only to predict another player‘s behavior but also in 
order to simulate the other player‘s reasoning and beliefs, so that a shared mental model of all the 
rational agents results wherein they all conform with the terms of agreement.  
This explains, if not justifies, why the agent may categorize or recognize this  situation (until 
proof of the contrary) as an element of  the class wherein agents conform to the norm. It 
produces, as a matter of description of how players de facto reason not as a matter of deduction 
from whatsoever absolute logical principle, the state of reciprocal beliefs that justifies the 
decision of any player to carry out the strategies consistent with the psychological equilibrium of 
full conformity to the principle T. In the Trust Game the pair (e, a).  
Of course, it is also possible that a player may have a mental model of an agent who does not 
comply with an agreement, and until proof to the contrary, this model can be also assigned by 
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default to other players in order to simulate their choice. If generalized, such a mental model 
would generate a state of mutual beliefs such that the predicted equilibrium point is the one 
where no player respects the norm, and hence the firm abuses and the stakeholder plays no-entry. 
Note that this equilibrium is also compatible with conformist preferences, for when a player 
predicts that the other will abuse, his psychological best response most compliant with the 
principle is no-entry. This is also the prediction that would induce the other player to abuse also 
on the basis of his conformist preferences.  
To be consistent with the idea of default reasoning we may proceed as follow. If a player has agreed 
on a fairness principle it normally has a mental model of an agent who carry out the  
corresponding commitment, for this is the behavioral content of the principle he has agreed to. 
Moreover nothing in his base of knowledge (until proof or evidence to the contrary ) contradicts 
that an agent who subscribed to an agreement on the principle will carry out the corresponding 
commitment (assume this is provisionally true).  At the same time it may be the case that it comes 
to the player‘s mind that an agent may also not comply with the agreed principle and (assume 
that) nothing in the player‘s base of knowledge contradicts that proposition. Thus to the player‘s 
mind come two mental models, that  are both contingently true according to two different 
incomparable mental framings of the situation.29 Each considered by itself these mental models 
allow a default inference in the format ―it is not inconsistent with the base of knowledge 
that…..‖. But taken together they are inconsistent. Thus, we cannot conclude by default 
reasoning (i.e. by a conclusions in term of what is ―normally true‖) given our base of knowledge 
and given our two contrasting defaults (i.e. rules of implication) that an agent  will ―normally‖  
conform or not with the agreed principle. There is some uncertainty about whether the state 
wherein we are either belongs to the situations set sketched by a one frame or by another. This 
admits that players express through a subjective probability distribution their beliefs about the 
two possible equilibrium points corresponding to the generalization of the two mental models. 
Now consider that the players are again just two. Since the same mental model may come to the 
mind of both the players with exactly the same vividness, they share the same uncertainty about the 
same shared mental models (what does not imply that the prior probability must be uniform - 
this will depend on the degree of vividness of each shared model.) 
                                                          
29
 The idea that different  mental models, according to different framing of the situation, may ―come to the player‘s‘ 
mind‖ is taken from Bacharach (2006), even if I do not discuss here  the interpretation that the model within  which 
the agent is seen as compliant with the agreement can be interpreted as a consequence of  what Bacharach called ―we 
thinking‖.  
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But a probability distribution over two pure strategy equilibria does not guarantee a consistent 
prediction of an equilibrium solution, and it allows for inconsistent best replies  chosen by the 
players.  The second step in the cognitive-predictive function then consists in assuming that the 
common prior generated by the two plausible  mental models is taken as the starting point for a 
revision dynamics of expectations, such that for a reasonable range of prior beliefs the 
equilibrium point of full conformity is selected as the outcome of the revision dynamics. This 
step therefore actually reduces to the plausible hypothesis (experimentally testable) that agreeing 
impartially on a fair principle will give the shared mental model of a rational agent (who conform 
to the principle) sufficient vividness to say that both players will in fact start their belief revision 
dynamics at a prior wherefrom they will necessarily converge to a point where they will 
completely believe that the solution of the game will consist in the psychological equilibrium of 
full compliance. The remaining work is left to the proper operation of an appropriate dynamic of 
belief revision.     
To this end I adopt the tracing procedure (Harsanyi 1975, Harsanyi and Selten 1988) which is an 
eductive equilibrium selection dynamics whereby the prior probabilities distributed over a pair of 
feasible equilibrium strategies for each of two players are continuously modified as a result of a 
repeated mental simulation of both players‘ best reply calculations given the current state of each 
player‘s beliefs. Each simulation that identifies a player‘ best reply to the current state of his 
beliefs augments according to the probability of that player‘s strategy with respect to its prior 
probability.  
Along this mental process of simulation, players never actually carry out a decision until 
uncertainty vanishes.30 They simply repeatedly calculate their best reply given a revised prior, and 
these priors are revised on the basis of the best replies just calculated at the previous stage of the 
process. At any step the simulated best eply of the second player nurtures the change in the first 
player‘s beliefs by assigning additional probabilities to the simulated choice, thus affecting the 
recalculation of the first player‘s best reply, and hence inducing also a further change in the 
second player‘s expectation. Only at the end of the process, when the players have both reached 
mutually compatible predictions concentrated on a particular equilibrium point, do they actually 
carry out their strategy choices.  
To gain an idea of the tracing procedure consider a thought process that takes place in a sort of  
―reasoning time‖ which  by construction starts from a stage of complete uncertainty t° = 0  and 
                                                          
30
  On evolutionary equilibrium selection mechanisms with learning through repeated plays see Young  (1998). The 
distinction of ‗eductive‘ VS.  ‗evolutionary‘ equilibrium selection dynamics is given by Binmore (1987).  
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continues until a stage of perfect predictability t1 = 1 is reached. Time is a continuous parameter t 
that varies from 0 to 1, so that for example its realization  tn is identical to the number 0<n<1. 
Assume that at time t° = 0 players A and B think that just two equilibrium points are possible. 
Given a prior p° that assigns probabilities over the two possible pure equilibrium strategies 
(indexed 1 or 2) of the two players A and B, each of them separately  maximizes his expected 
payoff by choosing a pure strategy ij (for i =A,B, j = 1,2).  At any further time t
n the prior 
probability of each equilibrium strategy ij for each player is revised in consideration of whether 
at the previous point in time tm (where, granted m<n, m is taken as near as possible to n) that 
strategy is calculated to be the best response of a player to his current expectations or otherwise. 
Given for each equilibrium strategy ij the prior probability p°(ij)  = p°ij revisions are generated 
by the following simple algorithm 
 1-tn(p°ij) + t
n  is the probability at time tn of the player‘s i equilibrium strategy ij whenever  
at time  tm i is calculated to be player‘s  i best reply;  
 1-tn(p°i,k≠j) is the probability at time t
n  of any other equilibrium strategy i,k≠j that at t
m is  
not calculated to be the  player‘s best reply. 
As time passes, the tracing procedure entails that the prior p° loses more and more of its initial 
weight, whereas the probability derived from a strategy being recursively predicted to be the 
player‘s best response tends to 1.    
The tracing procedure is a dynamic that simulates the formation process of mutually consistent 
expectations. Thus it also seems appropriate for the study of psychological equilibrium selection, 
such as (e, a) or (e, a) in the psychological TG - which are well defined only for states of 
knowledge wherein expectations of first and second level are consistent with the prediction of a 
particular equilibrium. Until these systems of mutually consistent expectations have been formed, 
a player cannot act on the basis of  his conformist preferences and therefore remains naturally 
involved in an outguessing process. A player thinks that two equilibria − (e, a) or (e , a) – are 
possible, and hence the two mutually consistent expectations systems supporting each of them 
are thought to be possible as well. Then the player is uncertain about which of the two 
expectations system is actually the case. Indeed, a common prior (and any revision of it) 
represents not only a player‘s uncertainty about the adversary‘s two equilibrium choices but also 
his prediction on the other player‘s uncertainty about his own equilibrium choices (thus, for each 
player, at least expectations of first and second order about the other player‘s choices and beliefs are 
derived from a common prior and its revisions). 
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(Insert fig. 9 about here) 
 
Consider the phase diagram of fig.9. It is a probability square representing all the possible discrete 
probability distributions over player A‘ and player B‘s pairs of the equilibrium strategies (e,  e) 
and  (a,  a). From each player‘s point of view the square can be seen as representing his own 
uncertainty (prior and revised according to the procedure) about the other player‘s two possible 
equilibrium strategies and his prediction about the other player‘s uncertainty (prior and revised) 
concerning his own two possible choices - both derived from a common prior and its revisions. 
The probability of player A‘s strategy e varies from 0  to 1 (the reverse for strategy e)  moving 
upward  along the vertical sides of the square. On the other hand the probability of player B‘s 
strategy a varies from 0 to 1 (the reverse for strategy a) moving rightward along the horizontal 
sides of the square. Thus each point within the square represents a pair of probabilities assigned 
to players‘ A and B strategies e and a respectively (and taking  the complement also the 
probabilities assigned to the alternative strategies of both the players  e, a).  Corners  
represent pure strategies pairs when they are perfectly predicted (with probability 1) as indicated 
thereafter :  
top-left:  (e,  a); 
top-right:   (e , a) ,  
down-left:  (e, a); 
down-right:  (e,  a)   
 
Starting from each inner point within the square, the tracing procedure plots a single and 
uniquely determined path whence forward beliefs change until a corner is reached (this happens 
by construction because at time t1 uncertainty necessarily vanishes  and each player comes out 
with a ―probability one‖ prediction of the pure strategies they are both playing).  
Each equilibrium has in effect a basin of attraction defined by all the starting points wherefrom a 
path begins and evolves through the tracing procedure until it reaches the corner corresponding 
to a given equilibrium.  Equilibrium basins of attraction are indexed in the phase diagram of fig. 9 
by X for corner (e,  a)  and Y for corner (e,  a). From every inner point within one of these 
basins the dynamics tend to converge through continuous belief revisions to the relevant 
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attractor (pure strategy equilibrium). Along these paths players always select as best replies against 
their current expectations a pair of strategies that jointly compound an equilibrium pair, so that 
their choices never approximate a result where their incentives become incompatible. Players will 
continue to play the relevant pair of equilibrium strategies until they reach a point where they 
predict with ―probability one‖ that each of them will play exactly the equilibrium which is the 
attractor of the basin wherein the path has started.  
As far as paths starting from outside any basin of attraction are concerned, the procedure tends 
to induce a ―change of mind‖ in the players. Note that in the phase diagram of fig.9 all paths 
traced by the procedure tend to move away from a non equilibrium corner toward another non 
equilibrium corner. Actually, from the region Z paths generated by the tracing procedure move 
toward North-Right, i.e. toward the non equilibrium outcome (e, a), while from the region Q 
paths move toward South-Left i.e. the non equilibrium outcome (e, a). Along these paths 
players make choices that accord with their current expectations, but also increase step by step 
the probability of reaching a non equilibrium outcome that progressively reduces both players‘ 
calculated expected utilities for the ongoing best replies. Player A, for example, along a path 
starting from a point in Z, is afraid to reach the corner (e, a) where he gets only 0 in terms of 
overall payoff. Hence he is under increasing pressure to change his choice to e. At the same 
time player B see probabilities of drawing closer to corner (e, a), where he gets only the overall 
payoff 5 instead of 6, which he would get in (e,  a). Hence he is under pressure to change his 
choice to  a . The effect of the increasing probability of the disequilibrium outcome, however, 
eventually induces one player to change his choice before the other. This happens when they 
reach a switching point where the path intersects the boundary of an equilibrium basin of 
attraction. At that point, paths switch from the current trajectories and turn toward the relevant 
equilibrium corner which is the attractor within the intercepted basin of attraction. 
It is noticeable that the tracing procedure admits a large range of situations wherefrom the 
dynamics selects the equilibrium (e, a). Specifically not only all the paths starting from inner 
points within the basin of attraction X , but also all the paths starting at points in the region Z 
above the boldface broken diagonal depicted in fig. 8 will reach (e, a). These paths in fact will 
eventually reach a switching point at the boundary of the basin of attraction X, where the tracing 
procedure makes sure that player B for the first time, and before player A‘s incentive to change 
his choice becomes too intense, changes his choice and starts playing the alternative equilibrium 
strategy  a.  Moreover, all the paths starting from region Q above the boldface diagonal will 
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switch toward the corner (e, a) when they cross the boundary of the basic of attraction X. In 
that case player A, who until that moment would have been choosing the strategy a  as his best 
reply within the dynamics process, changes his best reply as he is under pressure of the risk to 
reach the non equilibrium outcome (e,  a). Over the boldface diagonal this happens 
necessarily before than an analogous incentive pushes player A to switch from strategy   a  to 
strategy a. 
However it is also true that the largest part of the probability square gives rise to paths, those 
staring at point beneath the boldface broken diagonal, converging to the equilibrium corner (e,  
a). This means that the tracing procedure does not allows by itself an unique prediction that the 
equilibrium fully conformist with  CSR norm will be selected.  
We must here resort again to the first step in our two-tier answer. The ex ante agreement on a 
principle of fairness by default allows the formation of a prior belief favorable to the 
propositional content of the mental model representing an agent discharging the commitments of 
his agreement. Just after the agreement there is no evidence that any player will not conform, 
whereas there is the intuitive evidence of the mental representation of an agent who agrees to a 
principle and hence expresses at least at that point in time the commitment to carry out a certain 
behavior later on.  
Despite it would be excessive to say that this completely resolves the players prior uncertainty, it 
justifies the assumption that, after an agreement on the CSR norm amongst the firm management 
and stakeholders has been worked out – as far as it is understood as a constitutional, fair, initial 
(ab origine) agreement under the ‗veil of ignorance‘ -  the model of a compliant agent ‗comes to 
their mind‘ with most vividness. This implies that by an impartial, voluntarily devised behind an 
hypothetical ‗veil of ignorance‘ agreement over a principle of fairness, players can escape from a 
real life context of mutual distrust, in case they are already living within it. To say it differently, 
the thought experiment of putting players under a ‗veil of ignorance‘ allows them to abstract 
from a concrete context of distrust and to frame the situation as one of ‗constitutional choice‘ 
whereby they from the beginning choose the rule for entering a new interaction. This permits them 
to make default inferences abstracting from their previous experience within non constitutional 
situations and to reason solely on what is appropriate in such a perspective.  
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If this hypothesis is tenable, the starting point of the tracing procedure will be set at a place 
above the boldface broken diagonal of our phase diagram, and then the tracing procedure will 
carry it to converge to the fully conformist  psychological equilibrium.31  
  
This  concludes our discussion of the four roles of voluntary but explicit  CSR norms. They allow 
the description of strategies and equilibrium points, even if the equilibria are multiple, in a game 
played under unforeseen contingencies. Secondly, a CSR norm permits the ex ante selection of 
the equilibrium point that meets the requirements of an impartial choice. An explicit agreement 
on a contractarian norm is moreover a way to introduce psychological conformist equilibria, and 
quite surprisingly to derive the significant result that mixed strategy equilibria are absent in a 
psychological repeated Trust Game. Lastly, a cognitive and predictive role is played by an 
equilibrium selection mechanism that, from a state of predictive uncertainty about possible 
equilibrium points, generates a state of mutually consistent expectations (equilibrium 
expectations). An extensive range of prior probabilities, which are largely plausible and consistent 
with the assumption that players have agreed on an ex ante norm affecting their de facto mutual 
expectations, are consistent with the prediction that players will converge on believing that the 
solution of the psychological game is the (entry, no abuse) equilibrium, so that they will actually play 
their strategies component in this equilibrium. The theory of the endogenous implementation of 
the normative model of multistakeholder fiduciary duties is thus complete. 
                                                          
31 In favor of this  hypothesis there is some reliable laboratory‘s evidence gathered by  experimental studies about the 
formation of conformist preference  (Sacconi and Faillo 2005,  Faillo and Sacconi 2007, Sacconi and Faillo  2008, 
Faillo , Ottone and Sacconi , 2008).   Experimental subjects in an apparently cheap-talk, pre-play collective choice 
situation are given the opportunity to agree impartially (i.e. under a ―veil of ignorance‖) on a principle of fair division 
they will be in the position to implement ex post in a non cooperative game they will successively play -  wherein 
they do not have any material incentive to comply with the principle. It comes out however that most of the 
experimental subjects conform with the principle and, what is most compelling,  they conform against their material 
interests just because they believes other participants in the agreement  (even if it is completely anonymous) will also 
conform and believe others will conform. Only difference between the players who decide before making the 
experience of a fair, impartial,  anonymous agreement and those who decide in the game after having participated in 
the pre play fair agreement, is the agreement itself. Hence, we conclude that the decisional experience of a fair, 
impartial  anonymous agreement under the veil of ignorance is by itself  able to generate the frame of mind such that 
the  mental model solely comes to their mind , or it comes with the maximal relative vividness, such that an agent act 
consistently  with  the behavioral content of the agreement,  so that they rationally reply by the equilibrium strategy 
of full conformity to the principle.  
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Fig.4 Symmetric translation of the payoff space XAB  with 
respect to the utility axes, so that the utility function UA is 
replaced by UA‘  = UB and vice versa  
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But also NBS in XAE 
(the basic game)  
UB 
UA 
fig. 6, Symmetric translation of the repeated TG payoff space and 
its ‗intersection solution‘ 
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(1,1) 
(3, 3) 
(4, 4) 
(6, 6) 
(2.36, 5.41) 
(1,  4.75) 
(3.62, 5.62) 
(0,5) 
(1.84, 5.3) 
(1,1) 
(2.4, 4.4) 
 
 
 (1.56, 4.6) 
      (1.3, 4.7) 
UB 
UA 
fig. 7, The payoff space of the iterated psychological TG. Payoffs of pure 
and mixed strategies are represented and their translations into the 
psychological game payoff space. Up to the mixed strategy B
0.39 no 
psychological utilities accrue to players and hence a region of the basic TG 
payoff space does not translates into the psychological payoff space.  
74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1,1) 
(4, 4) 
(6, 6) 
(2.36, 5.41) 
(1,  4.75) 
(3.62, 5.62) 
(1.84, 5.3) 
(1,1) 
y 
Z 
UA 
UB 
(3,3) 
    X 
fig. 8, payoff spaces of the repeated  psychological TG under three values of the 
parameter  
 <1 implies the NE frontier Z 
 = 1 implies the NE frontier Y 
  =2 implies  the NE frontier  X 
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fig.9, the Tracing Procedure represented in a phase diagram 
with two basins of attraction 
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